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boundaries between public and private in financial transactions, this controversy
raises important issues of first impression: To what extent, for example, should
lawyers be able to issue legal opinions that create negative externalities?
Furthermore, what should differentiate the roles of lawyers and accountants in
disclosing information to investors? Resolution of these issues not only helps to
demystifY the mystique, and untangle the morass, of legal opinion giving, it also
affects the very viability of the securitization industry, which dominates American,
and increasingly global, financing.
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In a vital area of finance, lawyers are being increasingly criticized, 1 and
sometimes even threatened with liability/ for issuing traditionally required
legal opinion letters. 3 Although their primary use is to assure investors and
rating agencies on bankruptcy issues,4 these so-called "true sale" and
"nonconsolidation" opinions are often separately used by accountants for
advising that structured-finance transactions5 should be characterized, in a
company's financial statements, as "off-balance-sheet financing" rather than
debt. 6 The former characterization allows a transaction to be accounted for as
I. See, e.g., Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1017, 1094-95 (2004) (observing that "none of these [complex financial
manipulations] could have been consummated without the assistance of sophisticated, elite law
firms, which had to render legal opinions known as 'true sale' opinions and 'nonconsolidation'
opinions"); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 1236, 1242-43 (2003) (criticizing the bar for issuing structured-finance opinions in
transactions that later turned out to be accounting shams); Mike France, What About the Lawyers?,
BUS. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 58 ("By writing those opinion letters, attorneys blessed several
transactions now being attacked as deceptive."). Cf Nathan Koppel, Wearing Blinders, 26 AM.
LAW. 75, 166--68 (July 2004) (suggesting that, even beyond conspiracy claims, the lawyers in
Dynegy lnc.'s "Project Alpha" structured transaction deserve blame for failure to properly account
for Project Alpha as debt). Professor Deborah Rhode of Stanford Law School likewise argues that
lawyers should be sensitive to the possibility that their opinions may be used for fraudulent
purposes. Id. at 164. Professor George Cohen of the University of Virginia School of Law
similarly contends that, regardless of the accountant's role in the matter, "it is the lawyers'
obligation to [ask] ... 'Is this fraudulent? [s this deal designed to mislead investors?'" Id. at 168.
2. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549,692 (S.D.
Tex. 2002) (refusing to dismiss claims against a law firm when the complaint alleged, among other
things, that the law firm issued true sale opinions necessary to effectuate the client's allegedly
fraudulent plan). Cf Carrie Johnson, Lawyers in the Limelight, SEC Helps Police Their
Misconduct, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2004, at EOI (suggesting, among other things, that the
Securities and Exchange Commission will more aggressively file civil charges against lawyers).
3. This Article uses the terms "legal opinion letters," "legal opinions," and "opinions"
interchangeably. For a discussion of the nature of legal opinions, see infra notes 42-70 and
accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
5. See irifra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (describing structured-finance transactions).
6. Generally accepted accounting principles, or "GAAP," require these opinions for an
accountant to certifY a transaction as off-balance-sheet. See ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND
SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin.
Accounting Standards No. 140, ~ 21 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000) [hereinafter FAS 140];
AU Section 9336, Interpretation of AU Section 336, Using the Work of a Specialist (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 200 I) (requiring evidence of whether a transaction would be described
as a true sale to be considered). In practice, this can result in the substitution of legal opinions for
accountants' exercise of fully independent judgment (as was required in the past under Financial
Accounting Standard No. 77) in determining whether financial assets have been sold. The resulting
dual-information problem exacerbates, but is not the core reason for, the information failure this
Article ultimately identifies as most problematic. See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
Although the question of whether accountants should be permitted to rely on legal opinions in
making accounting determinations is beyond this Article's scope, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (F AS B) recently raised the possibility of severing the accounting from the legal
determination under FAS 140. See Memorandum from the Statement 140 Amendment Team to the
Members of the Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. (Sept. 29, 2004), available at http://www.
fasb.org/board_meeting_minutes/09-22-04_qspe.pdf (providing the minutes of the Sept. 24, 2004
board meeting, which clarified that accountants meet the isolation requirement by determining that a
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a sale of assets and not a borrowing-the rationale being that the assets are (as
the opinions provide) legally sold by the company to a separate entity,7 and
even bankruptcy of the company will not reverse that sale or allow a court to
consolidate the assets of the company and that separate entity.8 Thus, the
company engaging in the transaction does not have to show additional debt on
its balance sheet. 9
Structured-finance transactions include securitization, project finance, and
similar transactions in which companies originating fmancial assets, such as
accounts receivable, loans, or lease rentals, utilize special-purpose vehicles
(SPVs, sometimes referred to interchangeably as special-purpose entities or
SPEs) to facilitate the transaction. In a typical securitization transaction, for
example, the company (sometimes referred to as the "originator") sells rights
to payment from the financial assets to a wholly owned SPY, which in turn
transfers these rights to an independent SPY, which in turn issues securities to
capital market investors. The independent Spy uses the proceeds of the
issuance to pay the first Spy for the financial assets, and the first SPY then
uses those proceeds to pay the originator. The investors, who are repaid from
collections of the fmancial assets, buy the securities based on their assessments
of the value of the financial assets. 10
transaction would be supported by a legal opinion if one were requested). There is also precedent in
the corporate disclosure area for attorneys and accountants to work together to reach a mutually
acceptable agreement on the extent to which accountants can rely on legal opinions. See
ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, ~ 36 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) [hereinafter FAS 5] (noting that the advice oflegal counsel should
be taken into consideration when determining whether the condition for a loss accrual is met). Any
change in this practice is likely to occur through a treaty approach or a change in GAAP, because
FAS 140 still requires accountants to rely on structured-finance opinions. As such, individual
attorneys or law firms will be reluctant to withhold such opinions, as they would risk being fired (or
not rehired) by their originator clients.
7. This separate entity being one or more special-purpose vehicles, or SPVs, as described in the
next paragraph.
8. The true sale opinion provides that the assets should be treated as legally sold, under
bankruptcy law, by the company to that separate entity; the nonconsolidation opinion provides that
even the company's bankruptcy should not allow a court to consolidate the assets of the company
and that separate entity. Opinions are needed because structured-fmance transactions could be
viewed as either sales or secured loans under bankruptcy law, depending on their facts. STEVEN L.
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION
§ 4: I, at 4-3 (3d ed. & Supp. 2005).
9. This use of structured-finance transactions is sometimes seen as a form of "earnings
management." See Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for
"Dirty Pooling" and Some Other Types ofFinancial Cosmetic, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141, 160 (1997)
(discussing off-balance-sheet financing as a type of earnings management).
10. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REv. I,
6 (1999) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Irrationality]. For a more complete analysis of securitization, see
SCHWARCZ, supra note 8, § I: I, at 1-5 (noting that prospective buyers of SPY -issued securities look
to the cash flow of the SPY -owned receivables backing those securities rather than to the credit of
the company originating those receivables), and Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset
Securitization, I STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Alchemy]. For a
discussion of other (including inappropriate) uses of SPVs, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the
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Structured-fmance transactions that are used to raise money off-balancesheet are not inherently bad, and indeed can have important benefits, such as
better allocating risk with assets. II However, they also can mask liabilities that
only first become evident when a company goes bankrupt. Say, for example, a
company is able to characterize a transaction as a sale with contingent
recourse,12 which otherwise (but less appropriately) would be viewed as
balance-sheet debt. 13 In a sale transaction, the contingent recourse only needs
to be shown on the company's balance sheet if the contingency is "probable.,,14
Although diligent investors would learn of contingent liabilities by reading the
footnotes to the balance sheet l5-such liabilities must be disclosed in those
footnotes if the contingency is merely a "reasonable possibility,,16-investors
often focus exclusively on the balance sheet itself without regard to risks
disclosed in the footnotes. 17 They therefore often fail to anticipate that, in a
Use and Abuse o/Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1309 (2002)
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Enron].
II. Schwarcz, Enron, supra note 10, at 1315 (arguing, based on a pronouncement by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, that "transfer of risk is, and should be, central to the
accounting determination").
12. This is a sale where the SPY buyer has recourse (e.g., under warranties) against the
originator under mutually agreed to circumstances. The existence of contingent recourse against the
originator is not necessarily inconsistent with the observation, supra note II, that transfer of risk is
central to the accounting determination. In all structured-finance transactions, the originator (i.e.,
the company transferring financial assets to the SPY) retains, and on an arm's-length basis must
retain, first-loss risk on those assets to compensate for the information asymmetry between those
parties. Id at 1316 n.38.
13. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
14. FAS 5, supra note 6, "i["i[8-13 (requiring balance sheet disclosure only of "probable"
contingent risks).
15. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1539, 1556
n.87 (2004) ("Post-Enron, no reasonable investor can claim ignorance of financial statement
footnotes; investors have been widely educated to carefully review those footnotes as part of their
investment or credit decisions.").
16. FAS 5, supra note 6, at 6 (allowing only remote risks to remain undisclosed). Moreover,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FASB INTERPRETATION No. 45 "i[9 (2002) requires
guarantors to at least recognize on their balance sheets a liability for the fair value of the guarantee
obligation. See also § 401(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745, 785 (2002) (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.c.). Sarbanes-Oxley attempts to
maximize GAAP disclosure of contingent liabilities by amending § 13 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78m (2005». It adds a subsection (j), requiring the SEC to issue the
following:
Final rules providing that each annual and quarterly financial report required to be filed
with the Commission shall disclose all material off-balance sheet transactions,
arrangements, obligations (including contingent obligations), and other relationships of
the issuer with unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have a material
current or future effect on financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of
operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, capital resources, or significant components
of revenues or expenses.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401(j).
17. Cf Anne Tergesen, The Fine Print: How to Read Those Key Footnotes, Bus. WK., Feb. 4,
2002, at 94, 94-95 (Investors "could have had a heads-up that all was not quite right at [Enron] long
before the bad news broke in October. The source of this information? The footnotes companies

2005]

The Limits of Lawyering

5

bankruptcy, contingent recourse may be asserted as a claim against the
company.18
Nonetheless, true sale and nonconsolidation opinions-the legal opinions
most commonly associated with off-balance-sheet financing l9-are frequently
issued by most major law firms.20 These opinions (hereinafter, "structuredfinance opinions") address only bankruptcy law issues and make no accounting
analysis. 21 Indeed, their primary as well as historical purpose is to assure
investors and rating agencies22 that the structure of the Spy transaction is
are required to publish with their financial statements .... Footnotes do not make for easy reading,
however, and the numbers are often difficult to decipher.").
18. One commentator suggested that the problem of possible investor failure to anticipate
contingent recourse could be remedied by disclosing structured-fmance transactions, including any
associated contingent recourse, more prominently than in footnotes-perhaps even as a separate
accounting category. I disagree. That disclosure would remove the "filter" effect that occurs when
an accountant makes an informed assessment of the transaction and associated recourse, resulting in
an information dump that would make it harder, not easier, for investors to make informed
investment decisions. If the mere existence of contingent recourse were prominently disclosed,
investors would have insufficient information to assess the risk, often misleading investors into
believing that the company is riskier than it really is. Neither approach is likely to achieve a fair
presentation of the company's financial condition. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the
Disclosure Paradigm in a World o/Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. I, 16-17 (citations omitted):
One therefore might ask whether structured-transaction disclosure could be reduced, in
at least certain cases, to easy-to-understand elements like contingent recourse against
the originator. This has an apparent simplicity: assess the risk that an originator will
become liable for any contingent liabilities, and then include those liabilities, or a riskdiscounted portion thereof, in the originator's financial statements. This approach,
however, would suffer from at least the same problems that a similar approach suffers
in derivatives disclosure: it is impossible ex ante to precisely assess the risks, whereas
a worst-case disclosure overemphasizes unlikely risks while potentially ignoring risks
that are more realistic .... [T]here are no shortcuts to remedying disclosure's
insufficiency.
Moreover, even if more prominent disclosure were a solution, my Article is normative and does not
purport to solve that problem per se. Rather, I use that problem only to illustrate the urgent need to
better understand legal opinions.
19. See supra notes 5-6.
20. E-mail from Edward M. De Sear, Securitization and Structured-Finance Partner, McKee
Nelson LLP, to author (Apr. 15,2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter De Sear E-mail].
21. True sale and nonconsolidation are solely issues of bankruptcy law. SCHWARCZ, supra note
8, § 3:4, at 3-22; § 4: I, at 4-2. Thus, the "consolidation" referred to in a nonconsolidation opinion
solely concerns whether an originator and the Spy with which it is transacting would be
substantively consolidated or regarded as a single legal entity under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code
for purposes of allocating the priority of claims against assets. Id. § 4: II, at 4-38; § 4: 12.3, at 4-50
(noting that, under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, "substantive consolidation treats [the SYP and
the originator] as the same entity in bankruptcy"). Accounting consolidation, in contrast, solely
concerns whether that Spy's assets and liabilities should be included in the consolidated financial
statements of the originator. Id. § 7:4.
22. Rating agencies are private companies that assess, or "rate," the risks associated with the
full and timely payment of debt securities. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering 0/ Public
Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. I, 2-3 (2002). Investors rely on the
rating based on the rating agency's reputation. Presently, the most reputable rating agencies are
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, Moody's Investors Service, Inc., and Fitch Investors Service,
Inc. Id. at 6-7. "Because a high rating signals low credit risk to investors, a company that issues
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"bankruptcy remote.,,23 Furthermore, these opinions typically are-and, for
purposes of the following discussion, initially will be assumed to be (although
I later relax this assumption24)-technically correct as to the legal matters they
purport to cover?S
Note that this Article's scenario must be distinguished from cases where
lawyers issue legal opinions intended to be used to facilitate accounting or
bankruptcy fraud. 26 Although structured-finance opinions address bankruptcy
law issues, such opinions typically are given at a time when bankruptcy is
perceived merely as a theoretical possibility, not as a likely risk. 27 Similarly,
although structured-finance opinions are complex and require a great deal of
sophistication on the part of counsel,28 there is nothing inherently deceptive or
illegal about them or the structured-finance transactions on which they opine. 29
[highly rated] secuntJes can-other things being equal-more easily attract investors for its
securities than can a company that issues lower rated securities. Therefore, the company with
highly rated securities can pay a lower interest rate on those securities, and still attract investors,
than can the company with the lower rated securities." Id. at 8.
23. See, e.g., Christopher Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TvL. L.
REv. 101, 122 (1997) (explaining that rating agencies typically require opinion letters from
originator's counsel "stating that the Spy likely will not be substantively consolidated with the
originator and that the transaction will effectively remove the assets from originator's bankruptcy
estate"). For a discussion of "bankruptcy remoteness," see SCHWARCZ, supra note 8, § 3.
24. See infra notes 248-64 and accompanying text.
25. De Sear E-mail, supra note 20 (observing that he has "no reason to doubt the technical
correctness of the true sale and nonconsolidation opinions that are rendered by law firms that are
nationally recognized in the area of structured finance").
26. See 10hn P. Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.l. 371, 421
(discussing a case in which the SEC alleged-and Freeman assumed as true for purposes of
argument-that "the lawyers knew or should have known that [the company whose financial
statements were being certified] intended to use the opinions to satisfy [the accountants] that the
sale of [a subsidiary and the parent company's] gain therefrom could be accounted for in [the parent
company's] financial statements for the fiscal year ended August 31, 1969," even though
negotiations for that sale had not even commenced when the opinions were given, and the opinions
failed to disclose that negotiations had not commenced). That case is superficially similar to this
Article's scenario in that "it is not the issuance of the [legal] opinions per se that [is] illegal" but,
rather, the accounting purpose for which the opinions are ultimately used. Id. at 424. However, that
case is fundamentally different because this Article's scenario assumes that the lawyers neither
know nor should know that their opinions will be used to facilitate an accounting fraud (although
they know, or should know, that their opinions will be used to facilitate off-balance-sheet
accounting, presumably in accordance with GAAP).
27. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 10, at 137.
28. See, e.g., SCHWARCZ, supra note 8, § 4:1, at 4-5 (observing that the "cases [on true sale] are
not easily harmonized, and different readers can argue as to which factors are relevant and which
are entitled to the greater weight"); TriBar Opinion Committee, Opinions in the Bankruptc-y
Context: Rating Agency, Structured Financing and Chapter 11 Transactions, 46 Bus. LAW. 717,
721 (1991) (stating that these opinions are normally provided in "reasoned" form, signifying
inherent "uncertainties and limitations to the recipient"). A typical reasoned structured-finance
opinion resembles, in the author's experience, a mini-treatise, comprising 40-60 single-spaced
pages.
29. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1551-74 (arguing that securitization, the dominant form of
structured-finance transaction, is efficient, fair, and economically desirable); see also Schwarcz,
Enron, supra note 10, at 1314-18 (distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate uses ofSPVs
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Nor is there any proof that lawyers, in rendering these opinions, have mens rea
or the intent to mislead the public. 30 Even though, as mentioned, off-balancesheet financing may sometimes mask liabilities that only first become evident
to some investors when a company goes bankrupt (and thus those investors in
fact may be misled),31 diligent investors would have learned of those liabilities
by reading the footnotes to the company's fmancial statements. 32
Why, then, are lawyers being accused of wrongdoing merely for issuing
these opinions?33 And, in that context, what duties should a lawyer owe the
public in rendering the opinions? These questions go to the essence of what it
means for lawyers to issue legal opinions that create negative externalities
(hereinafter simply "externalities,,)34 such as by potentially misleading readers
of financial statements issued by companies acting as originators and thus
ultimately misleading investors in those companies' securities. 35 If lawyers
issuing legal opinions owe a duty to the public as well as to the opinion
recipient, is that duty the same, for example, as the duty an internal
government lawyer owes the public when writing a legal opinion that advises
and arguing that even transactions designed solely to achieve accounting results should not be
presumptively unlawful).
30. But cf In re Emon Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 704-05
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (refusing to dismiss claims against a law firm when the complaint alleged, among
other things, that the law firm issued true sale opinions necessary to effectuate the client's allegedly
fraudulent plan).
31. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
33. These accusations arise, I will show, because structured-finance transactions can have
potential information failures. I argue, however, that these failures are primarily the fault of
investors, and at most they are exacerbated by the dual-information problem-that legal-opinion
information is accurately provided for one purpose, .bankruptcy, but then used out of context for
another purpose, accounting. Also, to some extent these accusations reflect the reality that when
companies fail, lawyers are often the deepest pockets. And, because the criteria for a bankruptcy
sale are not at all clear-cut, the existence of contingent recourse in the underlying transaction may
prompt injured parties and regulators to assert that structured-finance opinions are wrong. To avoid
the costs and vagaries of litigation, such cases are usually settled even where the opinions are
accurate. These accusations can also result from the imposition of retroactive laws.
34. The infringement of rights of noncontracting parties is referred to as an "externality." See,
e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1111 (1972). The economic definition of
externality is "the indirect effect of a consumption activity or a production activity on the
consumption set of a consumer, the utility function of a consumer or the production function of a
producer." 2 THE NEW PALGRA VE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 263, 263-65 (John Eatwell et al.
eds., 1987). Legal commentators, however, usually define externalities as harm (or costs) to third
parties. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM.
L. REv. 1416, 1436-41 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2325-26 (1995); Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and

Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1817, 1818-19 (1993). Third parties theoretically may
even include the public at large.
35. I emphasize the potential for misleading investors in the originator's securities because, in
a typical structured-finance transaction, only those investors-and not the SPV's investorspotentially would be misled. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
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on the legality of interrogation policies for enemy detainees?36 And, in a
broader sense, exactly what type of "speech" is a legal opinion? Remarkably,
these are virtually issues of first impression.
These questions also force a rethinking of the ambiguous line between
disclosure required by securities law and the accounting disclosure implemented through issuance of certified financial statements. Although the latter
originated as a financial-information subset of securities law disclosure,
explicitly delegated to the accounting profession by the Securities and
Exchange Commission,37 the boundary of that subset has blurred in recent
years. 38 As a result, and as the legal opinion controversy illustrates, there is
uncertainty about the proper divide between the role of the lawyer and the role
of the accountant in disclosing information to investors.
On a more practical level, the answers to these questions will dictate the
very viability of the entire structured-finance industry. The economic consequences are enormous: securitization, for example, "one of the dominant
means of capital formation in the United States,,39 and one that is rapidly expanding worldwide,40 has over six trillion dollars of financing outstanding in
the United States alone. 41
This Article first discusses the nature of legal opinions. It then examines
and assesses the criticisms of structured-finance opinions in the context of the
historical debate over whether and to what extent lawyers have a responsibility
to the public in addition to their responsibility to clients. The Article next
analyzes, from a normative standpoint, what constraints should bind
structured-finance opinions and the lawyers who provide them. Because the
analysis is normative, its critique of legal opinion practice in the United States
may help inform the practice abroad. Finally, the Article examines the extent
36. I refer, of course, to the now infamous August I, 2002 memorandum from Assistant
Attorney General Jay Bybee, prepared with the assistance of Deputy Assistant Attorney General
John c. Yoo and others in the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R.
Gonzalez, Counsel to the President, advising on interrogation methods that supposedly would not
violate prohibitions against torture. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General,
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1,2002) (on file with author).
37. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 319, 320, 346--47 (2002)
(discussing the SEC's delegation of disclosure power to the accounting profession through the
profession's privately organized Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which resulted in
GAAP).
38. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Financial-Information Failure: Rethinking the Boundary Between
Lawyer and Accountant Liability 5--6 (Sept. 20, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(observing that "the increasing complexity of financial transactions has blurred the boundaries
between [the accountant's and the lawyer's] disclosure duties").
39. Investment Company Act Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 'If 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992) (provided in connection with the SEC's issuance of
Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940).
40. SCHWARCZ, supra note 8, § 8: I, at 8-3.
41. Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1655, 1656 (2004) (referring to 2003 domestic financial statistics showing that "[a]s of the end
of 2002, there were more than 6 trillion dollars of outstanding securities issued in securitizations").
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to which the analysis sheds light on the more general problem of business
lawyers issuing legal opinions that create externalities.
I.

The Nature of Legal Opinions

Legal opinions are merely informed judgments, usually in writing, given
by lawyers on issues oflaw. 42 Although legal opinions are sometimes directed
to clients, in a transactional setting legal opinions are often provided, at the
request of clients, to or for the benefit of third parties43 such as financiers of
credit or investors. 44 Because the transactions requiring third-party legal
opinions span the entire range of business and financial undertakings,45 such
opinions have become far more prevalent than opinions directed to clients. 46
In fact, the vast majority of legal opinions in structured-finance transactions,
including virtually all true sale and nonconsolidation opinions, are third-party
legal opinions,47 typically provided to or for the benefit of the SPY's investors
by outside counsel to the originator. 48 Requiring outside counsel to provide

42. Special Committee on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions et aI., Legal Opinions to
Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 Bus. LAW. 1891, 1896 (1979) [hereinafter Easier Path] (stating
that a legal "opinion is not a guaranty, but merely a lawyer's informed judgment as to a specific
question of law").
43. In the author's experience, legal opinions are occasionally formally addressed to clients but
substantively intended to benefit (or, at least, also benefit) third parties who are explicitly permitted
to rely thereon. This Article regards such opinions as "third-party" legal opinions.
44. See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY, THIRD PARTY LEGAL OPINIONS: EVALUATION AND
ANALYSIS 5-8 (1995) (discussing the purposes and uses of third-party legal opinions, and
comparing such opinions to legal opinions issued to clients); see also Scon FITZGIBBON &
DONALD W. GLAZER, FITZGIBBON AND GLAZER ON LEGAL OPINIONS § 1.3.1, at 5 (1992) (noting
that "the lender, acquiring company, or underwriter" makes use of closing opinions). For clarity,
this Article will refer to parties-whether the client or third parties--explicitly authorized to rely on
legal opinions as "opinion recipients," in contrast to other third parties or the public.
45. Third-party legal opinions are typically required, for example, in secured and unsecured
financings, mergers and acquisitions, securities offerings, real estate transactions, debt financings,
securitizations, and purchase agreements. See FITZGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 44, § 1.3.1, at 5.
46. Cf id. § 1.1, at 3 (referring to third-party legal opinions as a "feature of the American
legal scene"); Committee on Legal Opinions, ABA Section of Business Law, Law Office Opinion
Practices, 60 Bus. LAW. 327,327 (2004) (observing that "[e]very week hundreds, if not thousands,
of third party legal opinions are delivered at closings for business transactions"); see also Bryn
Vaaler, Bridging the Gap: Legal Opinions as an Introduction to Business Lawyering, 61 UMKC L.
REv. 23, 27 (1992) (describing third-party legal opinions as "[t]he most prevalent type of written
opinion rendered by business lawyers").
47. See generally STANDARD & POOR'S, STRUCTURED FINANCE: LEGAL CRITERIA FOR U.S.
STRUCTURED FINANCE TRANSACTIONS 173-74 (2004), available at http://www2.standardandpoors
.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/SFJegal_criteria]INAL.pdf (discussing legal opinions required to rate
various structured-finance transactions).
48. Even true sale and nonconsolidation opinions that are formally addressed to the client but
substantively intended to benefit the SPY's investors, who are explicitly permitted to rely thereon,
are effectively third-party legal opinions. See supra note 43.
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these opinions helps assure the independence-and hence, the integrity-ofthe
opinions. 49
Third parties commonly require these opinions as a condition precedent to
closing business transactions. 50 The opinions provide some assurance that, at
least insofar as those parties have requested opinion coverage (coverage of a
third-party legal opinion, although theoretically a private matter to be
negotiated among the parties to a transaction, is often dictated by customary
expectations of the opinion's recipients 5 !), nothing legally problematic lurks
beneath the transaction's surface. 52 Lawyers providing the opinion apply

49. In this context, it should be noted that investors are not misled due to agency problems,
which arise when attorneys give opinions to nonclient third parties. Whereas if attorneys give
opinions to their own clients, the incentives are more aligned and the attorneys are more likely to
inform their clients of problems. Even if third-party opinion recipients hired their own counsel,
however, there is no reason to believe they would receive more accurate or informative opinions.
Indeed, any misleading of investors is unrelated to the relationship between attorneys issuing the
opinions and third parties receiving such opinions. The latter are investors in the SPY's securities,
whereas only investors in the originator's securities are potentially misled. See supra notes 12-18
and accompanying text; see also Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 6 n.36 (distinguishing an originator's
investors "from the very narrow and highly specialized class of sophisticated investors in securities
issued by the SP[V]s that are parties to the originator's structured transactions").
50. Committee on Legal Opinions, Guidelines for the Preparation of Closing Opinions, 57
Bus. LAW. 875,875 (2002) [hereinafter Guidelines] ("The agreement for a business transaction will
often condition a party's obligation to close on [a legal opinion's] receipt."). Cj Committee on
Legal Opinions, Third-Party Legal Opinion Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord, of the
Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, 47 Bus. LAW. 167, 169 (1991) [hereinafter
Silverado Report] ("Custom and practice have developed over the years pursuant to which a legal
opinion is delivered at the closing to parties to the transaction (e.g., an acquiror, lenders or
investors) other than the opinion giver's client."); TriBar Opinion Committee, Third-Party
"Closing" Opinions, 53 Bus. LAW. 591, 596 (1998) [hereinafter TriBar 1998 Report] ("The
relevant agreement in a business transaction will often provide for delivery of an opinion letter as a
condition of closing.").
51. See, e.g., Easier Path, supra note 42, at 1894 (observing that third-party legal opinions
"have developed and evolved by a mixed pattern of custom, bargaining and need"); TriBar 1998
Report, supra note 50, at 640 (observing that opinion recipients typically need certain information
in the legal opinions and, therefore, such information has become customary in legal opinions). For
example, a financier requesting a third-party legal opinion will want coverage at least as broad as
that customarily expected by other financiers or investors to facilitate resale of the securities issued
in the transaction to other fmanciers or investors. See, e.g., I EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S.
REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 4.02[3], at 4-154-16 (6th ed. 2002) (noting that certain resales of securities are exempt from the Securities Act
registration requirements "if accompanied by (i) a legal opinion that the transaction in question is
exempt or (ii) an investment or nondistribution letter from the purchaser containing essentially the
same representations and agreements as those provided by the original purchaser, or both").
Sometimes coverage is also dictated by regulatory law. See M. JOHN STERBA, JR., LEGAL OPINION
LETTERS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO OPINION LETTER PRACTICE § 1.3, at 1-10 (3d ed. 2002)
(discussing securities regulations that require the issuance of legal opinions); see also ARTHUR
NORMAN FIELD, LEGAL OPINIONS IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 1:3, at 1-4 n.8 (2004) (citing a
New York regulatory requirement that requires opinions in bank mergers and acquisitions).
52. See FlTzGmBoN & GLAZER, supra note 44, § 1.1, at 1 (affirming that legal opinions assure
the company that "the transaction works from a legal point of view" and that "as a legal matter the
rights it is acquiring are those it has bargained for"); MACEY, supra note 44, at 6 (stating that a
"third party opinion may also be requested on the presumption that it will warn the recipient of any
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applicable law to the transaction's particular facts in order to reach their legal
conclusions. 53 In this sense, third-party legal opinions operate to effectively
reduce information asymmetry between parties to a transaction. 54
Correspondingly, the inability of counsel to deliver a requested opinion at
closing signals a problem and allows intended opinion recipients to refuse to
consummate the transaction. 55
. However, neither third-party legal opinions nor legal opinions addressed
to clients purport to evaluate a transaction's inherent business wisdom. 56 At
least heretofore, an opining lawyer has had no duty to evaluate the business
merits of the underlying transaction beyond the obvious ethical and legal
obligations of not knowingly furthering a fraudulent transaction. 57
potential problems which may arise from the transaction"); see also FIELD, supra note 51, § 1:5, at
1-5-1-6 (describing the role of legal opinions in providing some assurance to their recipients that
"property delivered at a closing ... has the desired legal characteristics and that the various
provisions ofa complex agreement, which purport to give a set of rights to each party, will be given
effect by the courts").
53. TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50, at 608. Thus, third-party legal opinions are not
typically requested on legal issues whose analysis would be independent of the transaction's fact
pattern. See Kaye Scholer Update 04-05 #2, at 1 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (observing that legal opinions are only required on legal issues whose underlying facts are
transaction specific).
54. See Vaaler, supra note 46, at 38 (discussing Professor Ronald Gilson's theory of
"transaction cost engineering" as it relates to the role of third-party legal opinions in diminishing
information asymmetry between transacting parties). I say that third-party legal opinions
"effectively" reduce information asymmetry because, technically, recipients of such opinions often
have the same factual information as opining counsel. However, opining counsel assesses certain
legal consequences of that information for the opinion recipients.
55. Third-party legal opinions can also decrease risks to the recipient by arguably hindering the
nonrecipient party's ability to "attack[) the validity of the transaction" after closing. Koley Jessen,
P.C. Legal Opinion Committee, Third-Party Legal Opinions: An Introduction to "Customary
Practice", 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 153, 155-56 (2001) [hereinafter Customary Practice] (quoting
George W. Bermant, Third party Legal Opinions, C533 ALI-ABA 1337, 1348-50 (1990)). But cf
SCOTT FITZGIBBON ET AL., FITZGIBBON AND GLAZER ON LEGAL OPINIONS § 1.3.2, at 11 (2d ed.,
Aspen Law & Bus. 2001) (stating that even though it has been suggested that a third-party opinion
letter "may foreclose, or at least make it awkward for the company to assert, certain defenses ... in
the event of a dispute," it is unlikely that a legal opinion will "dissuade [a] company from asserting
whatever defenses may be available to it or prevent a court from reaching its own legal
conclusions"). Nevertheless, third-party legal opinions are an accepted (and sometimes almost
mandatory) means of establishing due diligence on the part of a recipient corporation's directors.
Cf Customary Practice, supra at 156 (quoting Bermant that "[a]nother stated purpose is to satisfy
the recipient that the lawyer has done due diligence and assured himlherselfthat all is right with the
client"); see also FITZGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 44, § 1.3.2, at 8 (noting that "receipt of an
opinion letter may help directors and officers establish that they have exercised care and acted in
good faith if a transaction later turns out badly"); id. § 1.3.1, at 6-7 (stating that third-party legal
opinions are "one of the building blocks in the opinion recipient's due diligence investigation");
Guidelines, supra note 50, at 875 ("[T]he closing opinion serves as a part of the recipient's
diligence. ").
56. See TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 28, at 727-28 (stating that "bankruptcy law
opinions, like other opinions to third parties, only express views on specific issues oflaw and do not
impose an obligation of providing general advice to the recipient").
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. c (2000) ("A lawyer
may not do or assist an unlawful act on behalf of a client .... "); Guidelines, supra note 50, at 876
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Surprisingly, although third-party legal opinions are now almost
universally required in large business and financial transactions,58 their
widespread use is relatively recent. 59 The relevant scholarly literature is thus
sparse,60 and the scholarship concerning lawyer conduct within the adversary
legal system is largely inapplicable. 61 In past decades, however, bar associations and practitioners have tried to establish third-party legal opinion
guidelines and best practices. 62 Because the central role of these opinions is to
reduce information asymmetry, it is generally agreed that the goal of opinion

("An opinion giver should not render an opinion that the opinion giver recognizes will mislead the
recipient .... "); TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 28, at 728 n.34 (clarifying that "a lawyer
cannot, in any circwnstance, knowingly make a false statement of law or fact or knowingly assist a
client in committing a fraud"); TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50, at 602 (reinforcing the principle
that a lawyer may not mislead the opinion recipient).
58. See FIELD, supra note 51, § 1:3, at 1-3 (stating that "in most significant transactions,
lawyers routinely propose the opinions to be given in their early drafts of docwnentation," and that
although "[t]he details of these opinions are often modified in the negotiations ... the requirement
for an opinion, once asserted, is seldom deleted altogether").
59. See Customary Practice, supra note 55, at 155 (observing that third-party legal opinions
came into existence "only in the last forty years or so"). But cf FITZGIBBON & GLAZER, supra
note 44, § 1.1, at 2 n.5 (noting the use of third-party legal opinions at least as early as the
1930s).
60. The following articles, some more scholarly than others, touch on third-party legal
opinions: Thomas L. Ambro & J. Truman Bidwell, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Economics of Legal
Opinions, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 307, 307 ("This article will examine the ways in which a
third party legal opinion may, or may not, give value to the recipient and suggest that the necessity
for and scope of an Opinion should be measured in part on the basis of a costlbenefit analysis.");
Donald W. Glazer & Charles R.B. Macedo, Determining the Underlying Facts: An Epistemological
Look at Legal Opinions in Corporate Transactions, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 343, 343 ("This
article discusses a subject that has received very little attention in the literature-how lawyers deal
with facts in legal opinion letters."); Richard R. Howe, The Duties and Liabilities of Attorneys in
Rendering Legal Opinions, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 283, 283 ("This article focuses upon the
attorney's duties and liabilities as the giver of a legal opinion, and it explores the tension between
his or her role as advocate, negotiator, and implementer on the one hand, and as opinion giver on
the other."); Customary Practice, supra note 55 (providing historical background); John C. Quale &
Brian D. Weimer, Legal Opinions in Corporate Transactions Affected by FCC Regulation: An
Economic Approach, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 773, 775 (1999) ("In carrying out this analysis, the
Article argues that legal opinions add value to corporate transactions only when a lawyer is the
least-cost provider of the information sought."). Professor Macey also has written a book on thirdparty legal opinions, but it is primarily descriptive. See generally MACEY, supra note 44. Professor
Lipson is in the process of writing a comprehensive scholarly article exploring third-party legal
opinion practice. Jonathan C. Lipson, Price and Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice
Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation) (Feb. 16, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 130-43, 317-18.
62. The seminal works are Guidelines, supra note 50; Committee on Legal Opinions, Legal
Opinion Principles, 53 Bus. LAW. 831 (1998) [hereinafter Legal Opinion Principles]; Silverado
Report, supra note 50; James J. Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions-An Attempt to
Bring Some Order out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus. LAW. 915 (1973); Easier Path, supra note 42;
TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50. There are also a multitude of practitioner-oriented sources.
E.g., FITZGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 44.
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givers is to accurately and fairly present legal conclusions based on the
transaction's particular facts. 63
Sometimes, though, third parties request opinions on issues where the law
is undeveloped, unsettled, or otherwise not subject to black-letter certainty.
Many issues arising from an originator's bankruptcy, for example, present such
a degree of uncertainty.64 Nonetheless, assuming they have sufficient
expertise, lawyers traditionally will attempt to issue a requested opinion where
there is enough precedent or other authority to enable a degree of ex ante
prediction. 65
In those cases, lawyers normally issue "reasoned" opinions. 66 These are
legal opinions that, rather than setting forth black-letter legal conclusions,
engage in a substantive discussion of the applicable law and qualify that
discussion as appropriate with reasonable assumptions, cautionary language,
and disclosure ofuncertainties. 67 If opinion recipients wish to proceed with the
transaction despite these cautions and uncertainties, they do so forewarned and
at their own risk. 68 All structured-finance opinions are reasoned opinions,
63. See generally FIELD, supra note 51, §§ 4.1--4.6, at 4-2 (describing the opining lawyer as
"akin to ... a judge preparing a decision in a case, rather than that of an advocate for the client");
see generally id. §§ 4.1--4.6, at 4-1 (stating that "the opinion given must be fair and objective"); see
generally id. §§ 4.1--4.6, at 4-3--4-7 (detailing the process of the opining lawyer acting as a
"hypothetical contemporaneous court" in applying the law within the factual framework of a
particular transaction); see generally id. §§ 4.1--4.6, at 4-1 (stating that "the opinion given must be
fair and objective"); see a/so FITZGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 44, § 3.3, at 55 ("Because the
analysis included in a reasoned opinion is intended to inform, it should be fair, balanced, and
objective. As the ABA Guidelines correctly point out, reasoned opinions should not be 'an exercise
in advocacy."'); see a/so DONALD W. GLAZER ET AL., GLAZER AND FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL
OPINIONS 23 (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2005) ("Opinion givers and counsel for opinion recipients should be
guided by a sense of professionalism and not treat opinions simply as if they were terms in a
business negotiation."); see a/so Guidelines, supra note 50, at 878 (outlining the "Golden Rule" in
closing opinions: all requests and disclosures should abide by a general notion of fairness and
professionalism).
64. See supra note 28.
65. FIELD,supranote 51, § 2:4, at 2-5.
66. TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 28, at 734; see a/so FIELD, supra note 51, § 2:4, at
2-5 (discussing the use of reasoned opinions where unqualified opinions would improperly gloss
over the unsettled nature of a legal issue); STERBA, supra note 51, § 1.4, at 1-12 (stating that a
reasoned opinion "may be advisable either because the law itself is unclear, the facts are not entirely
straightforward, or the lawyer believes there are reasonable arguments that might lead to a different
legal interpretation than the one the opining lawyer favors"); Easier Path, supra note 42, at 1895
(observing that "it is inappropriate to seek to require an unqualified opinion on an uncertain or
disputed legal principle"). Cj FITZGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 44, § 3.3, at 55 (noting that even
when they may be confident in a certain outcome, attorneys may "choose to spell out [their]
reasoning to alert the opinion recipient to the contrary authority and to provide it the opportunity to
solicit the views of its own counsel").
67. See TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 28, at 721 (noting that "[t]he use of a reasoned
opinion is one method by which opining counsel communicates uncertainties and limitations to the
recipient, even if opining counsel is able to reach an unqualified conclusion'').
68. Easier Path, supra note 42, at 1895-96 (stating that "[i]f the opinion is qualified or
uncertain, the addressee is on notice of certain elements of limitation and should then satisfy itself
as to the risks of proceeding with the transaction in view of those limitations"); TriBar Opinion
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typically ranging twenty to fifty pages in length,69 and they function to reduce
infonnation asymmetry between the parties to the structured-finance
transaction regarding bankruptcy remoteness-the primary issue of concern to
the SPV's investors. 7o
Having discussed the nature of legal opinions, including structuredfinance opinions, I next examine the criticisms of those opinions in historical
context. References below to structured-fmance opinions mean reasoned,
third-party, structured-finance opinions. 71
II.

Assessing the Criticisms of Structured-Finance Opinions

Commentators have advanced, essentially, three criticisms of structuredfinance opinions: (i) wherever there are sufficient warning signs, a lawyer
should go beyond the technical tenns of the opinion and affinnatively
investigate the transaction for fraud; 72 (ii) a lawyer should have an obligation
to advise his client, and perhaps other opinion recipients, as to whether the
entire transaction is legal or not;73 and (iii) irrespective of whether a legal
opinion is technically correct, it is misleading if it does not fairly present the
situation. 74 To assess these criticisms, one must first understand the historical
debate over whether and to what extent lawyers have a responsibility to the
public-especially when issuing legal opinions-in addition to their
responsibility to clients or the opinion recipient. The criticism of structuredfinance opinions is ultimately intertwined with that debate.
A. The Historical Debate Over a Lawyer's Public Responsibility

"[A]t common law, an attorney has been traditionally viewed as owing a
duty only to the specific client for whom he perfonned his professional
service.,,75 Nonetheless, it often has been observed that attorneys function as
officers of the court in addition to their role as advocates for and counselors to
Committee, supra note 28, at 738 ("A reasoned opinion is sufficient to put the opinion recipient on
notice as to the uncertainties and limitations ... inherent in opining on those bankruptcy law matters
covered in the opinion.").
69. This estimate is based on the author's experience.
70. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 10, at 135-36 (explaining the two elements of
bankruptcy remoteness-a true sale for bankruptcy purposes of receivables from the originator to
the SPY, and protection of the Spy from the originator's bankruptcy-and observing that investors
in the SpY's securities require bankruptcy remoteness). Structured-finance opinions address these
precise two elements: whether there is a bankruptcy true sale, and whether the SPY could be
substantively consolidated with the originator's estate in bankruptcy. See supra notes 21, 23.
71. This reflects that virtually all structured-fmance opinions are third-party reasoned legal
opinions. See supra notes 47-49, 69 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
75. Marshall L. Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities Laws:
Private Counselor or Public Servant?, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1189, 1194 (1973).
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their clients. 76 That capacity might appear to imbue attorneys with some
measure of public responsibility.
During the formative years of common law development, however, there
was little if any real conflict between an attorney's responsibility to a client and
to the public. 77 Therefore, there was little need to try to define that latter
responsibility. The need to balance client and public responsibilities became
more acute, though, after passage of the federal securities laws. 78 These laws
governed, among other things, the lawyer's role in preparing disclosure to
investors of the risks associated with securities offerings. 79
As a result, shortly after these laws were enacted, one leading
commentator predicted "a restatement of [the attorney's] answerability to the
court and to society, and a reminder that he is not an ordinary employee of his
client.,,80 Before becoming Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Harlan
Stone once similarly commented on the need to examine a lawyer's public
responsibility, lamenting that the increased demand of business and finance for
76. See. e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 1 (2002) ("A lawyer, as a member of
the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.").
77. See, e.g., Small, supra note 75, at 1189 (observing that from the early 1930s until the 1970s
"there has been little occasion ... for the courts to consider the ... suggestion" that "the Securities
Act of 1933 may serve to broaden the responsibility and liability of lawyers to the investing
public").
78. These laws, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78111 (2005), primarily consist of the Securities
Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2005), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2005). For an argument that lawyers were viewed, even prior
to enactment of these laws, as having public responsibility as well as a duty to the client, see Robert
W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REv.
1185, 1207--08 (2003) ("No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil
or political, however important, is entitled to receive, nor should any lawyer render, any service or
advice involving ... deception or betrayal of the public." (citing CODE OF PROF'L ETHICS CANON
32 (1908)). Professor Gordon also observes that "[i]n the post World War II era, a group oflawyers
and legal academics ... theorized ... the role of the new corporate legal counselor as a 'statesmanadvisor,'" seeking the client's "long-range social benefit." Id. at 1208. That role, however, does
not necessarily appear to impose a public responsibility on the lawyer; instead, it might well reflect
the longstanding corporate law debate over whether directors should manage for immediate or longterm profits. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (discussing that
debate). In any event, Gordon notes that since the 1970s, this role "has been in decay," and now
"has almost no institutional support in the rules and disciplinary bodies that regulate the [legal]
profession." Gordon, supra, at 1209.
79. For example, a legal opinion provided to an underwriter in connection with an offering of
securities may support the "due diligence" defense available under the Securities Act of 1933. 15
U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2005). Likewise, Regulation S-K, an administrative interpretation of the
Securities Act, requires as an exhibit to the registration statement "[a]n opinion of counsel as to the
legality of the securities being registered, indicating whether they will, when sold, be legally issued,
fully paid and non-assessable, and, if debt securities, whether they will be binding obligations of the
registrant." 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (b)(5) (2005). See also Lipson, supra note 60, at 22 (observing that
"[a]lthough current banking regulations appear not to require closing opinions explicitly, lawyers
express a vague belief that opinion practice might have grown in response to some of the
requirements of the Banking ... Act of 1933").
80. Nathan Isaacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CAL. L. REv. 39, 47 (1935).
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the best lawyers "[a]t its worst ... has made the learned profession of an earlier
day the obsequious servant of business, and tainted it with the morals and
manners of the market place in its most anti-social manifestations.,,81 Even
those who disagreed with this view admitted that business pressures were
blurring the line between a lawyer's duty to his client and his duty to the
public. 82
Nonetheless, only decades later did anyone begin. to systematically
examine a lawyer's public responsibility by attempting to answer the narrow
question: "[T]o whom are the securities lawyer's duties owed?,,83 As that
question suggests, the debate over a lawyer's responsibility to the public has, at
least to date, been largely limited to the responsibility of securities lawyers. 84
And, even in that limited context, much of the recent debate has focused on the
technical issue of securities-lawyer exposure to aiding-and-abetting liability,
rather than on normative responsibility.85
81. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence ofthe Bar, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7 (1934).
82. See, e.g., Robert T. Swaine, Big Impact ofBusiness on the Profession: An Answer to Critics
of the Modern Bar, 35 A.B.A. J. 89, 171 (1949) (rejecting the charge that lawyers have become
servants of corporate clients but admitting that loyalty to these clients threatens lawyers'
independence); see also Freeman, supra note 26, at 373-74 (explaining the disagreement between
early commentators, such as Stone and Swaine, over whether lawyers were sacrificing their
integrity to serve corporate clients).
83. Small, supra note 75, at 1191; see also Freeman, supra note 26 at 374-76 (similarly
beginning to systemically examine a lawyer's public responsibility).
84. Small, for example, focuses on a lawyer's responsibilities only when rendering explicit
securities-law legal opinions or when "acqui[ring] and disseminati[ng] ... information in the
securities field." Small, supra note 75, at 1207. Moreover, the debate over a lawyer's public
responsibility appears to be even more narrowly focused on privity of contract and the question of
whether attorneys who otherwise violate securities law should be held liable to investors who are
not their clients. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The
Third-Party Liability of Accountants and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1309 (1991). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agendafor the SEC,
103 COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1310-16 (2003) (advocating a "gatekeeper" function for securities
lawyers so as to diminish the harm of defective disclosures to the investing public).
85. That debate concerns whether lawyers who participate in securities fraud can be held liable,
as aiders and abettors, in private causes of action under § 1O(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2005)) or Rule IOb-5 thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2005)). In
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank ofDenver, N.A., the Supreme Court held that
only primary actors, not aiders and abettors, could be held so liable. 511 U.S. 164, 175, 180 (1994).
Therefore, only if lawyers acted as primary violators of Rule IOb-5, such as by employing a
manipulative device or making a material misstatement or omission in connection with the sale of
securities, could they be held liable in a private cause of action. Id. at 191. Subsequent to the
Central Bank decision, lower courts have developed two divergent theories as to when primary
liability could attach to a secondary actor, such as a lawyer, for merely participating in the conduct
proscribed under § 1O(b). Under the first "bright-line" theory, the secondary actor must make a
material misrepresentation or omission that is attributed to that actor at the time of public
dissemination to be liable as a primary violator. See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d
169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that "the misrepresentation must be attributed to that specific actor
at the time of public dissemination, that is, in advance of the investment decision"); Aegis J.
Frumento, Misrepresentations of Secondary Actors in the Sale of Securities: Does In re Enron
Square with Central Bank?, 59 Bus. LAW. 975, 980-81 (2004) (discussing the emergence of lower
courts' theories as to when primary liability could be imposed on secondary actors under § 10(b)
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In contrast, recent events, including the Enron and W orldCom debacles,
have not only made the debate over a lawyer's public responsibilities more
urgent, but, significantly, have also expanded the debate's scope beyond that of
securities law or securities lawyers per se. 86 Lawyers issuing structuredfinance opinions, or other opinions associated with off-balance-sheet
financing, are neither acting as securities lawyers nor expressing opinions on
securities law. 87 They are, nevertheless, opining on matters that may impact,
albeit indirectly, disclosure to investors of corporate information. Should these
lawyers be responsible to the public for the ultimate use that is made of their
opinions, even if their opinions are neither incorrect nor misleading on their
jace?88 This Article focuses on that larger debate.
Having provided this historical context, I next attempt to assess the three
essential criticisms of structured-finance opinions.

after the Central Bank opinion). Under the second "substantial participation" theory, the secondary
actor need only have substantially participated or been intricately involved in the preparation of
fraudulent statements even if the secondary actor did not actually make the statements. Howard v.
Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000) (observing that the Ninth Circuit has
"held that substantial participation or intricate involvement in the preparation of fraudulent
statements is grounds for primary liability even though that participation might not lead to the
actor's actual making of the statements" (citing In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d
615,628-29,629 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994))). Cf Freeman, supra note 26, at 421-24 (arguing that issuing
a legal opinion to be used to achieve misleading accounting treatment is "the essence of actionable
aiding and abetting under the securities laws"). The substantial participation test has been widely
criticized, though, as being inconsistent with the holding of Central Bank. See, e.g., Frumento,
supra, at 995-1001. Recently, the court in In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.,
adopted a third "creation" theory, suggested by the SEC, under which a secondary actor who creates
a misrepresentation, whether acting alone or with others and irrespective of whether his identity is
disclosed to investors, can be liable as a primary violator under § 10(b), provided that he acts with
the requisite scienter. 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 586-89 (S.D. Tex. 2002). This theory has also been
criticized as being inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank. Frumento,
supra, at 996. There is no question, though, that a secondary actor who aids and abets securities
fraud under § 10(b), whether subject to a private cause of action or not, could be liable under 18
U.S.c. § 2, which imposes the principal actor's criminal liability on aiders and abettors. See 15
U.S.c. § 77t(e) (2000); Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 190.
86. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 78, at 1210 (noting that "events like the Enron collapse make
one realize that the corporate counselor would still have a useful role to play, if one could revive it
as one of the legal profession's many roles, to be deployed on occasions where clients and society
would be best served by independent, public-regarding legal advice").
87. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting that structured-finance opinions address
only bankruptcy law issues).
88. There is no implication here that these lawyers should have some duty to advise on
securities law; separate securities law counsel are virtually always engaged for transactions
involving the issuance of securities. Cf LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES
LAWS § 1.1 (4th ed. 2005) ("Although there may be areas oflaw a bright lawyer easily can learn on
his or her own from the statutes, rules, and cases, federal securities law is not one of them. Give an
eager and talented, but uninitiated, lawyer the Securities Act of 1933 and its rules and cases, provide
a few weeks of cloistered study, and the lawyer is likely to emerge encyclopedic but confused.").
To the extent necessary, however, securities lawyers preparing the disclosure ought to consult
structured-finance counsel--even if such counsel are at different firms-to ensure they're
accurately disclosing the structured-finance transaction.
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B. Assessing the Criticisms o/Structured-Finance Opinions
1. The First Criticism.-Commentators argue that wherever there are
sufficient "red flags," or warning signs, a lawyer should go beyond the
technical terms of the opinion and affirmatively investigate the transaction for
fraud. 89 Lawyers should not be able to say, for example, that they did not
understand why certain unusual documents are used in a transaction. One
commentator thus argues that if counsel in Dynegy's "Project Alpha" transaction had investigated why the parties entered into highly unusual "tear-up"
documents, they would have found that Project Alpha was structured to
achieve inappropriate off-balance-sheet treatment for what was effectively a
lending transaction. 90
I agree in concept that where there are sufficient warning signs, a lawyer
should--out of concern for integrity and reputation, not to mention the need to
understand the relevant aspects of a transaction on which the lawyer is
opining-affirmatively investigate for fraud. 91 The trick, though, is identifying
what constitutes warning signs: some "red flags" may be (metaphorically)
furled and hard to see, whereas "orange flags" sometimes might appear red.
As an example of the latter, the commentator mentioned above naively alleges
that where an SPV is used as a "fmancing vehicle," a true sale legal opinion is
necessarily misleading because the transaction must be regarded as a loan. 92
This commentator fails to recognize that virtually all structured-fmance
transactions have loan-like economics,93 a fact irrelevant to a true sale
determination. 94
2. The Second Criticism.-Others assert that a lawyer should have an
obligation to advise the client, and perhaps other opinion recipients, about the

89. See Koppel, supra note 1, at 164 (attributing this argument to Deborah Rhode, a professor
of law at Stanford University Law School); see also Gordon, supra note 78, at 1193, 1201 (arguing
that lawyers may need to inquire beyond their limited role where they suspect problems).
90. Koppel, supra note 1, at 165-66.
91. This does not mean, however, that the lawyer should investigate for fraud in the sense that a
district attorney would investigate. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (arguing that
opining counsel need only investigate sufficiently to see if the warning sign can be dispelled and the
requested opinion given).
92. Koppel, supra note 1, at 165 (arguing that in a recent case, "[i]n light of their roles as
draftsmen of [the SPY], shouldn't the lawyers have known that [it] was a fInancing vehicle [and]
shouldn't they have complained when it became clear that [it] would not [be] treat[ed] ... as
such?").
93. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the Tension Between
Form and Substance, 60 Bus. LAW. 109, lIS (2004) (arguing that "in form, securitization
transactions are contractually arranged sales of fmancial assets" but "[i]n economic substance,
however, they are not dissimilar to transfers intended as security (i.e., loans secured by the fInancial
assets)").
94. Id. at 109 (explaining why loan-like economics is not, and should not be, a basis for
recharacterizing a "sale" structure as a loan).
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legality of the transactions being opined on.95 Thus, the lawyer should ask,
irrespective of how an accountant would view a transaction, "Is this
[transaction] fraudulent or designed to mislead investors?,,96
This stance is especially problematic where outside counsel are asked to
opine only on certain aspects of a transaction. Examining the entire transaction
then would be costly. It is questionable whether this cost is justified, especially
since companies generally have no obligation to retain counsel when engaging
in business transactions. If this cost is not justified, counsel should only be
obligated to assess the legality of the relevant portions of transactions on which
they are opining97-recognizing, of course, that if counsel spot warning signs
in the course of that assessment, they should investigate further to the extent
discussed above. 98
3. The Third Criticism.-Finally, some commentators argue that a
structured-finance opinion is misleading, irrespective of whether it is
technically correct,99 if it does not fairly present the situation. lOo This criticism
has several fallacies. Exactly which scenario, for example, should an opinion
be fairly presenting where counsel opines only on certain aspects of a
transaction? To avoid unnecessary costs associated with examining the entire
transaction, it would appear that opinion givers should strive for fair
presentation only of the legal conclusions derived from the transaction's

95. Koppel, supra note I, at 168 (attributing this argument to George Cohen, an ethics professor
at University of Virginia School of Law).
96. Id.; Appendix C (Role of Enron's Attorneys) to Final Report of Neal Batson, CourtAppointed Examiner at \2, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing
the duties of Rex Rogers, the Enron in-house attorney primarily responsible for securities
disclosure, and concluding that "a fact-finder could determine that Rogers committed malpractice
based on negligence for his failure to inform himself about the [SPY] transactions so that he could
properly advise Enron with respect to the disclosure issues raised by these transactions").
97. Counsel need to understand the relevant portions of a transaction on which they are opining
because their opinion, which applies law to facts, is based on that understanding. See supra note 91
and accompanying text. An obvious corollary is that counsel's understanding must have a
reasonable basis. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 906
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (observing that "[w]here a defendant [in that case, a law firm] makes false
statements, honestly believing them to be true, but without reasonable grounds for such belief, he
may be held liable for negligent misrepresentation, a form of deceit").
98. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
99. This case should be distinguished from the situation where a professional's technical due
diligence is insufficient because, in light of the professional's special knowledge and continuity of
conduct, the professional should have known the advice is misleading. See, e.g., Bentel v. United
States, 13 F.2d 327, 329 (2d Cir. 1926) (observing that "there are many cases where from the
actor's special situation and continuity of conduct an inference that he did know the untruth of what
he said or wrote may ... be drawn"); see also United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 861"'{)2 (2d
Cir. 1964) (applying this principle to find that "[a]ny accountant must know that his obligations in
certifying 'pro forma' [financial] statements are not satisfied by any such arithmetical exercise as
[the accountant therein charged] performed"). My Article, however, assumes there is no mens rea.
See text accompanying supra note 30.
100. Koppel, supra note 1, at 166, 168.
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particular facts-e.g., whether there has been a true sale and whether
substantive consolidation is likely.lol
More significantly, the criteria for fair presentation of a company's
financial condition and results of operations are already dictated by generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). GAAP comprises a set of standards
for financial accounting and reporting, officially recognized as authoritative by
the SEC,102 that provide the "credib[ility], transparen[ cy], and comparab[ility]"
needed for "the efficient functioning of the economy.,,103 Because it is highly
technical and voluminous,104 knowledge about, much less expertise in, GAAP
is well beyond the learning of most attorneys.105 Requiring attorneys to

10 J. Cf supra note 63 (observing that because the central role of third-party legal opinions is
reducing information asymmetry, it is generally agreed that the goal of opinion givers is accuracy
and fair presentation oflegal conclusions derived from the transaction's particular facts).
102. See supra note 37; see also WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 131 (2003) ("In the United States, generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(F ASB), a self-regulatory body authorized by the Securities Exchange Commission to establish
accounting standards."); FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, Facts About FASB I
(2003-2004), available at http://www.fasb.org.
103. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, supra note 102, at I.
104. Sofia Adrogue & Alan Ratliff, Kicking the Tires after Kumho: The Bottom Line on
Admitting Financial Expert Testimony, 37 Hous. L. REv. 431, 486--87 (2000) ("A consideration of
the body of authority, guidance, and literature on accounting standards ... makes clear that, by any
objective standard, understanding accounting issues involves technical and specialized
knowledge. ").
105. See, e.g., David F. Birke, The Toothless Watchdog: Corporate Fraud and the Independent
Audit-How Can the Public's Confidence Be Restored?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 891,904 (2004) ("As
any former or practicing auditor can attest, GAAP can create a labyrinth of complex rules that only
an experienced auditor could hope to understand."). This does not impugn Professor Cunningham's
fundamental observation, with which I agree, that "[i]f business lawyers invariably confront
questions of law and accounting in their practice, and it is difficult to understand core concepts and
key cases in corporate law without a firm footing in accounting, it is incumbent upon the legal
professorate to assure it provides adequate teaching." Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing
Accounting's Burdens: Business Lawyers in Enron's Dark Shadows, 57 BuS. LAW. 1421, 1449
(2002). There is, however, a vast gap between understanding core concepts and applying technical
accounting rules. Cunningham may be conflating the two by calling for business lawyers to "make
it a professional habit to stay abreast of the top handful of hot topics of debate within the accounting
profession and also understand the accounting aspects of transactions they are involved with (e.g.,
true sale rules, leasing rules, and derivatives rules)." Id at 1456. Lawyers should not, however, be
obligated to apply technical accounting rules. See, for example, William O. Fischer, Where Were
the Counselors? Reflections on Advice Not Given and the Role of Attorneys in the Accounting
Crisis, 39 GONZ. L. REv. 29, 103 n.I75 (2003), arguing:
Some [meaning Cunningham] suggest that lawyers should now become more active in
client accounting and some advocate expanded accounting education for
lawyers. . .. This essay argues for caution. While lawyers should develop enough
knowledge to spot some accounting issues, it is unrealistic to suppose that attorneys
will serve as extra, consulting accountants. That would require too much training and
it would require lawyers to keep up with accounting developments as well as legal
ones. Most attorneys would not have the time. Moreover, lawyers would need to think
very hard before taking actions that would cause them to voluntarily shoulder the
liabilities, as well as the other "burdens," that accountants carry today.
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So
long as GAAP governs what constitutes a fair presentation of a company's
financial position and results of operations, independent public accountants,
not attorneys, \07 should make that determination. lOB
The foregoing assessment shows that none of these criticisms of
structured-finance opinions--{)ther than, to some degree, the first-is
compelling. The first criticism does not, however, provide a systematically
rigorous framework for analysis. I therefore will attempt to construct such a
framework.

See also William H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 Bus. LAW. 961, 962 (2003) (arguing that
"[t]he cultural problem revealed by Enron ultimately is not subject to correction by teaching lawyers
more accounting"). Professor Cunningham himself, upon reflection, may well be in agreement. Cf
Cunningham, supra, at 1455 ("As a technical matter, the duty of competence may not call for a law
firm's involvement in discussing appropriate accounting treatment.").
106. See, e.g., E-mail from Richard W. Painter, Guy Raymond and Mildred Van Voorhis Jones,
Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, and newly appointed White House Chief Ethics
Officer, to author (Feb. 13,2005) (on file with author) (observing that although the concept that a
legal opinion should fairly present the situation is "sound in principal," it is "notoriously vague if
used to impose liability on lawyers" and therefore might serve as a "definition of professionalism,
but not as grounds for civil liability").
107. Whatever merit there may be to the recent Sarbanes-Oxley requirement for management
certification of fair presentation, see infra note 286, lawyers-and especially outside lawyers-are
neither trained nor sufficiently informed to judge fair presentation. But cf Coffee, supra note 84, at
1313, 1312-15 (advocating that "the attorney principally responsible for preparing a disclosure
document or report filed with the SEC [be required] to certify: (I) that such attorney believes the
statements made in the document or report to be true and correct in all material respects; and (2) that
such attorney is not aware of any additional material information whose disclosure is necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading").
108. This does not mean that accountants and lawyers should not attempt to work together in
appropriate cases. Professor William Simon argues for a more fully interdisciplinary regime in
order to avoid the possibility of a "perfect circle of lack of responsibility." William H. Simon,
Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Remarks at Columbia Law School Symposium, March 21, 2005.
See also Cunningham, supra note lOS, at 1454: "A familiar pass-the-buck pas de deux in deal
meetings and conference calls occurs when the accountant says, after an impasse, 'that's a legal
problem' while the lawyer says 'that's an accounting problem.' Frequently the truth is what's not
said: both are right. Each should be more willing to venture into the other's territory .... " A fully
interdisciplinary regime, however, is likely to involve high transaction costs, whereas the practical
possibility of there being a "perfect circle of lack of responsibility" is mitigated by the overlap
between financial disclosure required under GAAP and securities-law disclosure required under
SEC Rule IOb-5. See infra note 159 and accompanying text (observing that offering documents,
such as prospectuses, independently must disclose any material risks in order to comply with SEC
Rule IOb-5).
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III. Building a Systematic Framework for Analysis
Because there is little precedent,109 my inquiry proceeds from
fundamental principles. First, I analyze whether constraints should bind
structured-finance opinions and the lawyers providing them, showing that the
main justification for imposing constraints in this context is to minimize
externalities. Next, I examine the externalities resulting from structuredfinance opinions and the corresponding appropriateness of constraints. Finally,
I expand that analysis to examine more generally the externalities resulting
from, and constraints appropriate for, other third-party business-law opinions.
(In these contexts, note that the third parties affected by opinion-generated
externalities are not the "third-party" recipients of such opinions; the third-

109. Although there is little precedent directly on point, I have examined the tax-shelter opinion
precedents to determine their potential applicability. Those precedents superficially appear relevant
because they address the duties of attorneys issuing legal opinions to third-party investors, albeit in
terms discussing the expected tax treatment of tax shelters. See also Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the
Gunslingers: Co-opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REv. 43,
57-59 (2001) (discussing how the ambiguities in tax shelter laws lead to a perception among
opinion writers that they will not be subject to malpractice liability). The various tax-shelter
opinions, however, turn out to be too fundamentally different to serve as precedents. Unlike
structured-finance opinions or, indeed, any of the other third-party business-law opinions later
discussed, tax -shelter opinions are not negotiated between sophisticated business parties but,
instead, are typically written ex ante as marketing tools for the "promoter" of the tax shelter to help
sell investments in the shelter. See id. at 50 (noting that one common characteristic of abusive
corporate tax-shelter transactions is that the promoter "who markets the transaction to a large
number of corporations bears the costs of developing the transaction and the corresponding legal
opinions"). Moreover, the externality caused by aggressive tax avoidance--less tax revenue-is
distributed diffusely among the public at large. Perhaps for this reason, minimization of tax liability
traditionally has been viewed in the United States as a legitimate goal, in and of itself. See
Chamberlin v. Comm'r, 207 F.2d 462,468 (6th Cir. 1953) (declaring that "[t]he general principle is
well settled that a taxpayer has the legal right to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be
his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits"). DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSALS 5--6 (1999), available at http://www.pmstax.comigenishelterIUSTreasShelt9907.pdf
("[R]eliance on a transactional legislation approach to corporate tax shelters may embolden some
promoters and participants to rush shelter products to market on the assumption that any
Governmental reaction would be applied only on a prospective basis."); Peter C. Canellos, A Tax
Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business
Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REv. 47,48 (2001) ("[P]romoters regularly recycle
old shelters that have been targeted by statutory, regulatory or interpretive changes by modifying
some element of the transaction to avoid the literal terms of the change (narrowly read) while
retaining the same discredited shelter objective."); Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti,
Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REv. 1,4 (2004) ("Tax shelter promoters have exploited
the move towards textualism by designing transactions that comply with the letter of the law but
that generate results clearly never contemplated by Congress or the Treasury."). In contrast,
structured-fmance opinions generally facilitate legitimate commercial transactions. See supra notes
26-29 and accompanying text.
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party recipients are effectively "contracting" parties,llo and the affected third
parties are the public at large who invest in the originator's securities.)111

A. What Constraints Should Bind Structured-Finance Opinions and the
Lawyers Issuing Them?
To begin this inquiry, recall the typical nature of structured-finance
opinions: they are technically correct as to the matters they cover; 112 they
address only bankruptcy law matters and make no accounting analysis; 113 and
counsel rendering these opinions do not intend them to be used to achieve
misleading accounting results or otherwise mislead the public. 114 What constraints should bind these opinions and the lawyers issuing them?
1. Conceptual Framework for Analysis.-Many terms, some with
overlapping meanings, \15 are used to describe why government imposes
constraints on private parties. Scholars talk about increasing social welfare, I 16
addressing the "tragedy of the commons,,,117 reallocating benefits and
achieving allocative fairness, llS maintaining norms and morals,119 preserving
110. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (observing that third-party opinion recipients are
ordinarily involved in negotiating those opinions).
Ill. See supra note 34 (defining externalities as infringement of rights of non contracting
parties). In the context of structured-fmance opinions, for example, the third parties affected by
externalities are investors in the originator; such investors are not contracting parties vis-a-vis the
structured-finance transaction or related opinions.
112. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
115. For example, it is implicit in the concepts of paternalism and externalities that only
"wrongful" actions are protected against; but government itself, based at least in part on morals and
norms, determines what is wrongful. It is also implicit in the concept of market efficiency, as
another example, that externalities are minimized. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 179 (1993)
("With externalities present, the market's allocation of goods is inefficient.... If firms do not have
to pay all of the costs ... equilibrium prices will be lower and output higher than they would be if
firms took social costs into account. ").
116. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REv. 961, 967
(2001) ("Our central claim is that the welfare-based normative approach should be exclusively
employed in evaluating legal rules. That is, legal rules should be selected entirely with respect to
their effects on the well-being of individuals in society."). Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 25 (6th ed. 2003) (explaining the common law as "a system for maximizing the
wealth of society").
117. The term comes from an article by Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243 (1968). A tragedy of the commons occurs when several independent persons all use
a common and diminishable resource and their aggregate use threatens the sustainability of that
resource. Baylor L. Johnson, Ethical Obligations in a Tragedy of the Commons, 12 ENVTL.
VALUES 271, 273 (2003) (citing Hardin).
118. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 116, at 999-1004.
119. E.g., Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law,
IDS COLUM. L. REV. 641, 641~3 (2005) (discussing how the efforts state and federal governments
made to protect sexual norms and public morals influenced the federalization of immigration laws);
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications For Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v.
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and enhancing the efficiency of markets,120 protecting parties from their own
actions (paternalism),121 and protecting parties from externalities. 122
Most of these reasons for imposing constraints do not appear to apply to
structured-fmance opinions. Except to the extent already bound up with
"market efficiency" or "externalities,,,123 such opinions are unlikely to impact
social welfare, problems of the "commons," allocative fairness, morals, or
norms. Paternalism also should not be a basis for imposing constraints because
structured-finance opinions are invariably issued in a sophisticated business
and finance context.
Market efficiency clearly applies to structured-finance opinions. It should
not, however, justify constraints because these opinions help to facilitate
structured-finance transactions, which themselves are efficient. 124 Moreover,
these opinions facilitate structured-finance transactions in an efficient way:
they target the precise two elements of information asymmetry of concern to
investors. 125
The principal basis for governmental imposition of constraints on
structured-fmance opinions therefore appears to be protection against
externalities. 126 Constraints could be couched as law or, where used to
constrain lawyer behavior per se, as ethical rules.127 Because this Article's
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1233, 1243-58 (2004) (tracing the government's use of moral-based
reasons as justifications for lawmaking).
120. POSNER, supra note 116, at 457; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 549-50 (1984) (claiming that the "efficient
capital market hypothesis" has become the dominant context "in which serious discussion about the
regulation of the financial markets takes place").
121. See, e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon's Teeth and Claws: The Definition
ofHard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 660 (2004) (defining paternalism as "the restriction
of a subject's self-regarding conduct primarily for the good of that same subject").
122. See, e.g., ALAN STONE, REGULATION AND ITS ALTERNATNES 91, 91-123 (1982)
("examining the concept of externalities, which may be defined as an activity that imposes costs or
benefits upon persons who are not parties to a transaction or contract"); see also supra note 34
(defining externalities). Protecting against externalities has long been a primary goal of
government. See, e.g., THE MISHNAH, Tractate Avot 3:2 (Jacob Neuser trans., 1988) ("Pray for the
welfare of the government. For if it were not for fear of it, one man would swallow his fellow
alive.")
123. See supra notes 120, 122 and accompanying text. I recognize, supra note 115, that these
terms have overlapping meanings.
124. See supra note 29 (observing that securitization, the dominant form of structured-finance
transaction, is efficient, fair, and economically desirable).
125. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting that investors in the SPV's securities
require a true sale of receivables to the SPV and protection of the SPV from the originator's
bankruptcy). I also later show that any information failure resulting from structured-finance
transactions is caused not by these opinions but by independent investor failures. See infra notes
153-62 and accompanying text.
126. Recall that these externalities do not actually affect the opinion recipient-the SPV and its
investors-but, instead, affect the originator's investors. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
127. Ethical rules derive from a subset of the above-listed reasons for governmental constraints,
with paternalism and minimizing externalities being the most prevalent. See Benjamin Hoorn
Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and
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analysis does not depend on the form of the constraints, !28 I will use the term
"lawful" to refer to externalities whose causation is neither illegal nor
government-constrained as unethical (so the term "unlawful" consequently
references externalities whose causation is either illegal or governmentconstrained as unethical).!29
I next focus on the extent to which externalities justify governmental
constraints and how those constraints should be applied. Before doing so,
however, it is important to distinguish opinion-giving from the traditional role
of lawyer as advocate.
The differences necessarily cause different
externalities, which explains why scholarship on lawyers' duties within the
adversary legal system is mostly inapplicable to the duties of lawyers issuing
structured-finance opinions. 130 Traditional lawyering-which focuses on
courtroom and client advocacy in an adversary system--can facilitate
externalities, and there is significant literature on the appropriate constraints to
mitigate these externalities.!3! Subject to those constraints, society accepts the
system of traditional legal advocacy. 132
Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429,433, 436, 467-75 (2001) (arguing that the two most
prevalent justifications for regulating the legal profession are consumer protection and minimizing
externalities to adversaries, the court system, and the public at large (the last being referred to herein
as "public externalities"». Although there are other reasons for ethical rules, see Sean J. Griffith,
Ethical Rules and Collective Action: An Economic AnalysiS of Legal Ethics, 63 U. PITT. L. REv.
347, 350 (2002) (arguing that legal ethics are a response to the collective action problems and
public criticism lawyers face, and that they exist for the collective interest of the bar), those other
reasons are irrelevant to structured-fmance opinions per se.
128. This Article need not differentiate, for example, between forms of governmental
constraints, such as civil liability, criminal liability, or suspension or termination of the license to
practice law. As used herein, the term "liability" includes all these forms of constraint.
129. By government-constrained, I include ethical rules promulgated by nongovernmental
bodies, such as the American Bar Association, but enforced by government power. In practice,
constraints on public externalities caused by structured-finance opinions are more likely to be
couched as law. Cf Barton, supra note 127, at 474-75 (arguing that the rules of professional
conduct for lawyers do not effectively correct public externalities, and observing that most ethical
rules that "even arguably address these externalities" are nonmandatory and occasionally hortatory).
To the extent feasible, of course, lawyers should strive also to meet aspirational goals for conduct.
Cf infra note 242 and accompanying text.
130. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSmILITY EC 7-3, EC 7-4 (1969) (distinguishing
between a lawyer's role as advocate and counselor). Professor Gordon similarly makes a distinction
between the lawyer as advocate and the lawyer as corporate counselor. Gordon, supra note 78, at
1194-95.
131. See, e.g., Robert P. Bums, Professional Responsibility in the Trial Court, 44 S. TEx. L.
REv. 81, 109-10 (2002) (arguing that current ethical restraints on trial lawyers represent an
important contribution to the fairness and effectiveness of the adversary system, but cautioning that
certain ethical tensions between complete candor and client advocacy are inherent in that system
and that the effects of further ethical requirements must be carefully considered before enacting
them); Gary Hoffman & Lauren Degnan, Responding to Hardball Tactics and Questionable Tactics
in Litigation: Limits on Advocacy, INSIDE LITIG., Mar. 1996, at 7 (noting the limits legal ethics place
on an attorney's behavior as a client advocate).
132. See, e.g., Robert Gilbert Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System as a Means of
Seeking Truth and Justice, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 147, 154, 160-61 (2002) (arguing that the
adversary system of litigation as tempered by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is an
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Opinion-giving can also facilitate externalities. But there is little learning
on the appropriate constraints because these externalities are different from
those of traditional lawyering. To understand why there are differences,
consider how a lawyer's traditional advocacy role differs from the role of
counsel in issuing opinions. One distinction is that, in the traditional role, there
is invariably counsel on the other side to balance the argument and thereby
mitigate externalities. This is not to say that this difference is black and white.
Counsel providing third-party legal opinions-the type of opinion comprising
virtually all structured-finance opinions 133--often have to negotiate their
opinion with counsel for the opinion recipient. 134
The second distinction is more clear-cut, however. Advocacy demands
unusually creative lawyering. Where a lawyer advocates for a client, the
lawyer's duty is to help the client win by creatively arguing that the client has
complied with law or has a stronger case than the opposing party.l3S There are,
of course, ethical constraints on the limits of advocacy, 136 but-subject to those
constraints--creativity is respected and valued. 137 Likewise, where the lawyer
advocates for a client in a negotiation, the lawyer's duty is to help the client
reach the best deal possible by creatively arguing the merits of the client's
position. 138
effective and superior mechanism for obtaining truth and justice). Cf Fred C. Zacharias, The
Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms
in Legal Ethics Regulations, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 829, 854-55 (2002) (noting that "[w]ith little
exception" the Model Rules rely on the adversary paradigm, but arguing that even where the legal
practice takes place within the adversary system "the premises that the code drafters attribute to the
adversary system sometimes do not hold true"). My observation is descriptive, not normative. I do
not purport to critique the constraints on externalities resulting from traditional legal advocacy.
133. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
134. Leslie L. Gardner, Note, Attorney Liability to Third Parties for Corporate Opinion Letters,
64 B.U. L. REv. 415, 419 n.34 (1984) ("[T]he general content of the legal opinion is usually
negotiated prior to its issuance."); see also Guidelines, supra note 50, at 877 (outlining the
negotiating process between opposing lawyers to determine the final form of the opinions); TriBar
1998 Report, supra note 50, at 599-600 (explaining that all transactions are unique and, as such,
require a certain amount of negotiation between opinion givers and opinion recipients).
135. See, e.g., In re Am. Fin. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 76,832, [1961-1964 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 81,088, at 81,092 (Mar. 19, 1962) (noting that although an
attorney "owe[s] a public responsibility," when he acts as his client's "advisor, defender, advocate
and confidant," he enters into a "personal relationship in which his principal concern is with the
interests and rights of his client").
136. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 127, at 471,473 (discussing those constraints); Griffith, supra
note 127, at 352-75 (same).
137. But cf Gordon, supra note 78, at 1204-07 (asserting that a corporate lawyer's loyalty
should run to the public as well as to the client-even in an adversary proceeding-because the
lawyer's role "is in large part a public role, designed to fulfill public purposes," as occurs when a
criminal defense attorney argues to suppress unlawfully seized evidence and thereby deters police
misconduct or advances one-sided, selective arguments that ultimately serve to keep prosecutors
"up to the mark").
138. See In re American Fin. Co., supra note 135, ~ 81,088, at 81,092 (distinguishing the
function of an attorney from that of a certitying accountant whose independence "may require him
to voice public criticisms of his client's ... practices").
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This perspective-that traditional lawyering is all about advocacy and,
thus, creativity-helps further explain why the well-known decision in United
States v. Simon 139 has not been extended to lawyers, at least in their traditional
advocacy roles. In that case, the court upheld jury instructions that an
accountant can be liable, even though the accountant complied with both
GAAP and generally accepted aUditing standards, if certified fmancial
statements do not "fairly present" the company's financial condition and
results of operations. 140 This decision reflects that an accountant's goal in
auditing a company and certifying the accuracy of its financial statements is
fair and objective presentation of the company's fmancial state. 141 Few if any
would say that that goal is, or can be, achieved through the use of creative
accounting.142 Fair and objective presentation, thus, is fundamentally different
from the goals of traditional legal advocacy.
In contrast, an opining lawyer's goal-to accurately predict a given legal
state by applying law to fact 143-is closer to accounting goals than to the goals
of traditional legal advocacy. Technical accuracy must be valued more than
creativity, and indeed creativity that undermines accuracy must be eschewed.
These differences necessarily cause externalities different from those resulting
from traditional legal advocacy, thereby muddling the legal-opinion debate.
I next examine to what extent these different externalities justify legal or
ethical constraints on structured-fmance opinions.

2. Examination of Extemalities.-By definition, externalities caused by
structured-fmance opinions affect the public, not the originator or the opinion
recipient. l44 For purposes of the analysis that follows, it is useful to divide
these externalities into two categories: lawful externalities and unlawful
externalities.

139. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
140. Id at 805---06 (affirming the trial judge's decision that compliance with GAAP could not
constitute a complete defense: "[T]he 'critical test' was whether the financial statements as a whole
'fairly presented the fmancial position of [the Company]"').
141. See, e.g., American Institute of Certified Professional Accountants (AlCPA) Code of
Professional Conduct §§ 53.01, 53.03 (emphasizing the accounting profession's dedication to
"objectivity," "integrity," and "a genuine interest in serving the public"); § 51.02 (acknowledging
"the [accounting] profession's recognition of its responsibilities to the public, to clients, and to
colleagues") (emphasis added).
142. But compare this goal to an accountant's more purely advocacy roles, such as helping a
client minimize taxes. Here the accountant, like an attorney, values creativity, and the law respects
that. Cf Chamberlain v. Comm'r, 207 F.2d 462, 468 (6th Cir. 1953) ("The general principle is well
settled that a taxpayer has the legal right to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his
taxes ... and that the taxpayer's motive to avoid taxation will not establish liability if the
transaction does not do so without it.").
143. See supra notes 53, 63 and accompanying text (citing various sources describing an
opining lawyer's role).
144. Cf supra notes 34 (defining externalities as harm to noncontracting parties), III and
accompanying text.
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All transactions, including structured-finance transactions, create
externalities. 145 Therefore, any time a lawyer issues a legal opinion that
effectuates a transaction, the lawyer is participating in creating externalities.
However, the paradigm of social ordering is that, left to independent bargaining, parties work out arrangements that-except to the extent the
arrangements create unlawful externalities 146-benefit the overall public
goOd. 147 To the extent lawyers facilitate these arrangements, they are working
to enhance the public good. This suggests that lawyers should have the right to
help facilitate lawful transactional arrangements by issuing legal opinions. A
fortiori, they should have the right to help facilitate lawful structured-finance
transactions by issuing structured-finance opinions.
In a business context, the primary limitation on the social-ordering
paradigm is that the arrangements should not create externalities that society
defines as unlawful. 148 Lawyers specifically help in this regard by advising

145. Cf STONE, supra note 122, at 97 (observing that "[s]trictly speaking, virtually every
activity involves an externality").
146. See infra note 148 and accompanying text (observing this limitation on the social-ordering
paradigm).
147. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 291-92,547-48 n.292 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford University Press 1993) (1776):
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his
capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its
produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the
annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends
to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring
the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security;
and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
See also Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4 INT'L REv. L. &
ECON. 131, 132 (1984) (asserting that courts should use "wealth maximization" as a guide to
judicial action where "the goal of such action is to bring about the allocation of resources that
makes the economic pie as large as possible, irrespective of the relative slices"); Michel Rosenfeld,
Contract and Justice: The Relationship Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract
Theory, 70 IOWA L. REv. 769, 847 (1985) (arguing that the "fact that parties in pursuit of selfinterest agree to an exchange indicates that the exchange in question is likely to enhance allocative
efficiency. Furthermore, the fine tuning arising out of the bargaining process serves the common
good by assuring that increased value is purchased at the lowest possible expense. Reciprocity,
then, not only permits the alignment of individual self-interest and the common good, but it does so
in a manner that ... is very reminiscent of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand"').
148. Persons injured by externalities that society does not define as unlawful sometimes have
the right to recover damages from parties causing those externalities-thereby effectively shifting
the externalities back onto those parties. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 116, at 383-85 (discussing
the optimal choice between "two methods of public control-the common law system of privately
enforced rights [i.e., the right to recover damages from parties causing externalities] and the
administrative system of direct public control"). Although this right to recover damages, where it
exists, supplements the social-ordering paradigm, it does not alter this Article's fundamental
analysis because of its self-correcting nature (i.e., shifting externalities back onto the parties causing
them).
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clients on whether their arrangements are lawful. Lawyers therefore are social
engineers contributing to this social-ordering paradigm.149
If lawyers were constrained from providing opinions to effectuate
bargained-for lawful business transactions that nonetheless may cause
externalities, they would be forced to substitute their judgment about
externalities for that of their clients. From an information standpoint, however,
clients generally have more and better information about the consequences of a
transaction, other than the transaction's legality. The clients therefore are
better positioned to make business decisions. Imposing a duty on lawyers to
second-guess their clients' business decisions would be inefficient. lso This
insight helps explain Congressional testimony on the role of lawyers m
rendering legal opinions:
If a transaction is not illegal and has been approved by the appropriate
levels of corporation's management, lawyers ... may appropriately
provide the requisite legal advice and opinions about legal issues
relating to the transactions [sic].
In doing so, the lawyers are not approving of the business decisions that
were made by their clients. lSI
Indeed, it is hard to see exactly how lawyers could be constrained from
providing opinions on transactions that create lawful externalities. Lawyers,
who are specialists only in law, would be ill-trained to assess and weigh the
costs (including externalities) and benefits of business transactions being
facilitated by their opinions. How, for example, would counsel asked to opine
on a proposed break-up leveraged buyout lS2 balance costs and benefits where
the resulting transaction creates a more efficient business but, in the process,
costs a thousand jobs, impoverishes a community, and destroys families?
Constraining lawyers from opining on lawful transactions that may cause
externalities would thus appear to be unworkable in practice.
149. Cf generally Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984) (describing lawyers as transaction-cost engineers, and
describing how legal opinions can reduce information-asymmetry costs).
150. See, e.g., James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization "Officer
of the Court", 48 BUFF. L. REv. 349, 387-88 (2000) (cautioning against "[c]laims that lawyers
should be free to disobey the client's lawful instructions"); Sean J. Griffith, Afterward and
Comment: Towards an Ethical Duty to Market Investors, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1223, 1234 n.43 (2003)
(cautioning that "[v]aguely defined duties to 'the public' threaten to increase the agency costs of the
legal representation as lawyers may seek to pursue their own ideological goals in favor of client
interests").
151. The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part 4: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Congo 20 (2002) (statement of
Joseph C. Dilg, Managing Partner, Vinson & Elkins).
152. For a discussion of fraudulent conveyance law in the LBO context and the no-fraudulentconveyance opinions required as a condition to funding, see generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas
H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829, 850-54
(1985); Raymond J. Blackwood, Note, Applying Fraudulent Conveyance Law to Leveraged
Buyouts, 42 DUKE L.J. 340 (1992).
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The social-ordering paradigm would be undermined, nonetheless, to the
extent expert advisors, such as lawyers and accountants, provide inaccurate
information that distorts transactional arrangements. This distortion could be
especially significant in a structured-finance transaction context, where legal
opinions and accounting disclosures are such a vital part of the information
flow. And, admittedly, sometimes there is an information failure: the
"masking" of liabilities that only first become evident when a company goes
bankrupt. 153
This information failure, however, is generally not the result of inaccurate
information provided by lawyers,154 nor is it likely the result of inaccurate
information provided by accountants. Although this information failure might
be exacerbated by a dual-information problem-legal-opinion information is
accurately provided for one purpose, bankruptcy, but is then used somewhat
out of context for another purpose, accounting l55-it does not primarily result
from that dichotomy. The underlying rationale behind off-balance-sheet
accounting is consistent with the bankruptcy opinion: the financial assets in
question have been sold. 156 GAAP views the bankruptcy opinion as merely a
convenient indicator of the sale. 157
The real information failure is the occasional investor failure to
understand, much less appreciate, underlying disclosure concerning structuredfinance transactions. This can occur for at least two reasons. One is that
investors-even sophisticated investors--do not always carefully review the
disclosure. They often focus, for example, exclusively on a company's
balance sheet without regard to contingent risks disclosed in the footnotes l58
and offering documents. 159 Although some investors might fail to focus on
these risks due to laziness, the more likely explanation for the failure is a
fundamental lack of comprehension that these risks can be significant,
resulting from a misunderstanding of the necessary and significant role of
contingent recourse in the sale of the financial assets. Because of information
asymmetries between sellers (in the structured-finance context, originators)
and buyers (in the structured-fmance context, SPVs), a buyer of fmancial
assets l60 always must demand, to the extent consistent with a true sale, some
153. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (observing that structured-finance opinions are
typically accurate regarding the legal matters they purport to cover).
155. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
156. See FAS 140, supra note 6, ~ 27.
157. /d.
158. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
159. Offering documents, such as prospectuses, must independently disclose any material risks
in order to comply with SEC Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (2005). Cf Cunningham, supra
note 105, at 1454 ("For any business transaction, there is an accounting consequence and in tum or
simultaneously a disclosure consequence. They are related.").
160. Recall that structured-finance transactions involve the sale of financial assets. See supra
note 5.
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amount of contingent recourse against the seller. 161 This recourse is a
necessary solution to the problem of quality uncertainty. 162
There is no question that this recourse must be disclosed. Law and
accounting standards have long required disclosure of all realistic liabilities,
including contingent recourse,163 and even "reasonably possible" contingent
liabilities must be disclosed in the footnotes to the originator's balance sheet. l64
Investors, however, generally tend to be familiar with ordinary sales of
tangible assets, in which contingent recourse, when it exists, is typically
limited to standard warranties. They therefore do not always comprehend that
a sale might expose the seller to this greater level of contingent recourse. The
obvious solution to this failure is to educate investors to carefully read and
understand the disclosure, including the footnotes to financial statements, to
ascertain and assess the possible contingent recourse. 165 To some extent, this
education has already begun.166
The second reason that investors occasionally fail to understand and
appreciate underlying disclosure is that some structured-finance and other
business transactions are so complex that disclosure is necessarily imperfectit either oversimplifies the transaction or provides detail and intricacy beyond
the comprehension level of even the most sophisticated investors and securities
analysts. 167 In the latter case, even if investors and analysts considered hiring
teams of experts, information asymmetries would remain. 168 This does not
161. See, e.g., Peter C. Pantaleo et aI., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial
Assets, 52 Bus. LAW. 159, 163 (1996) (discussing the importance of contingent recourse in the sale
of intangible assets); Schwarcz, Enron, supra note 10, at 1316 n.38 (observing that "although
securitization deals do shift actual risk, they always require the company originating the deal [the
originator] to retain sufficient first-loss risk on the transferred assets ... to minimize the [SPY]
investor risk to an investment grade leveL... [This recourse] logically follows from the
asymmetric information between the [originator] and the SP[Vl's investors").
162. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488,499 (1970) (referring to guaranties, which include what my Article
terms "recourse"). Although Akerlof suggested other potential solutions to the problem of quality
uncertainty, only the guarantee, or recourse, solution applies to the fact scenario of this Article.
163. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
165. Ascertaining the amount of contingent recourse and the likelihood that it will be asserted is
not a trivial task. See supra note 18 (examining whether contingent recourse could be disclosed
more prominently than in footnotes, perhaps even as a separate accounting category, but concluding
that such disclosure would remove the filter of an accountant making an informed assessment of the
transaction and associated recourse, resulting in an information dump that would make it harder, not
easier, for investors to make informed investment decisions; and also concluding that if merely the
existence of contingent recourse were prominently disclosed, investors would have insufficient
information to assess the risk, often misleading investors into believing that the company is riskier
than it really is).
166. See supra note 15 (observing that, post-Enron, investors have been widely educated to
carefully review financial-statement footnotes as part of their investment or credit decisions).
167. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 18.
168. See id. at 13-16 (explaining why institutional investors and securities analysts do not
always fully understand disclosure of complex transactions). To summarize this explanation, at
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necessarily mean that government should ban these transactions. 169 There are
other solutions. In addition to mandating disclosure, for example, government
could require management to be free of material conflicts of interest stemming
from complex transactions for which disclosure may be insufficient. 170 Note
that
[t]he rationale for this rule is that, in the face of complexity, investors
must rely not only on disclosure, but also on the business judgment of
management in setting up complex transactions for the company's
benefit. To that end, the law similarly should focus on, in addition to
disclosure, requiring management to be free of conflicts of interest that
would affect management's judgment in those transactions. This focus
would have prevented the conflicts of interest that allowed, and indeed
encouraged, the Enron abuses to thrive. 171
The foregoing analysis shows that the real information failure in
structured-finance transactions is unrelated to legal opinions per se and has
solutions that are likewise unrelated. Although the information failure is indirectly related to structured-finance opinions-insofar as such opinions
facilitate structured-finance transactions, which can cause information
failure-the solutions discussed above appear preferable to proscribing
structured-finance transactions (and thus proscribing the issuance of structuredfinance opinions) as a means of mitigating the information failure. 172 The
some level of complexity the costs of hiring experts will exceed, or at least appear to exceed, any
potential gain because the cost of hiring experts is tangible, whereas the benefit gained from fully
understanding complex transactions is intangible and harder to quantify. The more complex the
transaction, the higher the costs, and thus the more likely it is that the cost-benefit balance will be
out of equilibrium. Furthermore, market imperfections reduce the value of hiring expert analysts.
Scholars have found, for example, that investment-fund managers who, believing a stock is
overvalued, nonetheless follow the crowd will not be blamed if the stock ultimately crashes. This
imperfection is exacerbated by the typically limited time horizon of analyst employment; the analyst
may no longer be at the same job if and when a crash occurs, so accountability may be low to begin
with. On the flip side, even where analysts remain at the same job, they may lose their expertise
over time: they presumably were hired because of their structured-transaction expertise; but
structured-transaction markets evolve and, as analysts, they would no longer be employed doing
market deals. Moreover, these market imperfections are consistent with the results that would be
predicted by behavioral psychology. There also are practical limitations on understanding
complexity. The complexity problem affects investors in the originator's securities, yet those
investors are not necessarily the same institutions that participate in structured transactions-and
thus are less capable of understanding the complexity. Even where they are the same institutions,
the analysts reviewing the disclosure will not likely be, and may be prohibited from being, the
structured-transaction specialists. !d.
169. See id. at 21-23 (examining the consequences of proscribing complex transactions that
result in significant information asymmetry, and concluding that regulators should not want to
proscribe these transactions as a means of controlling information failure).
170. [d. at 31-32, 35-36 (discussing this "second-best" solution).
171. [d. at 37.
172. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1551-74 (arguing that securitization, the dominant form
of structured-finance transaction, is efficient, fair, and economically desirable); see also Schwarcz,
supra note 18, at 21-23 (showing why regulators should not want to proscribe structured-finance
transactions as a means of controlling information failure).
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information failure therefore should not affect this Article's normative
argument: where lawyers facilitate lawful transactions that create problematic
externalities, the focus should be not on lawyer conduct but instead on whether
to legally prohibit those transactions--or at least to subject the companies that
engage in them to liability in order to shift the externalities back onto those
companies. 173 To the extent these transactions are lawful, lawyers should
indeed have the rightl74 to "assist corporate managers to inflict enormous
damage and then argue ... that they are only doing the job they are supposed
to do."I75 Under the social-ordering paradigm,I76 lawyers acting in this fashion
will, overall, benefit the social goOd. l77
The foundation of this Article's framework, therefore, is that lawyers
should have the right to issue opinions that help facilitate lawful structuredfinance transactions. Completing the framework, though, requires resolving
two ancillary issues. In assessing lawfulness, should attorneys examine the
entire transaction or just the portion thereof relating to the opinion? And what
should lawfulness mean in a world of changing norms?

3. In Assessing Lawfolness, Should Attorneys Examine the Entire
Transaction or Just the Portion Thereof Relating to the Opinion?-In a perfect
universe, attorneys should examine an entire transaction to ensure that their
opinion does not inadvertently help to facilitate unlawful transactions. Our
universe, though, is imperfect-it has costs. From a cost-benefit standpoint,
reviewing an entire transaction, where only a portion need be examined to
render an opinion, does not appear warranted. For this reason, a lawyer
retained by an originator solely to provide a structured-finance opinion would
not be expected to assess the transaction's overall legality, and he certainly
would not be paid for work performed in making that assessment. 178 As a
practical matter, moreover, as outside lawyers specialize further and companies

173. See supra note 148.
174. That right being subject, of course, to the overriding right of a lawyer to resign if he or she
believes the representation is immoral or improper.
175. Gordon, supra note 78, at 1190.
176. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (describing this paradigm).
177. Consider also the extent to which lawyers' opinion letters, especially in public-law fields,
are essentially private ordering and whether the literature on private ordering adds to or informs the
foregoing normative framework. Compare Schwarcz, supra note 37, at 346-47 (pointing to the role
that private-ordering plays in the development of GAAP), with Freeman, supra note 26, at 377
(observing that "[t]here is inherent in the idea of the lawyer's being favored with a monopoly
license to practice law the premise that his performance as a professional will be subjected to selfregulation by the lawyer himself and to more formal regulation by the profession as a whole"). A
private-ordering perspective could be particularly relevant to structured-finance opinions because
accounting is an explicitly delegated form of private ordering, in which the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (F ASB) effectively acts as an agent of the SEC and individual accountants
effectively act as subagents. Schwarcz, supra note 37, at nn.37-38 and accompanying text; id. at
320 n.8.
178. De Sear E-mail, supra note 20.
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bring even more of their day-to-day work in-house, it is increasingly likely that
counsel retained to provide third-party legal opinions will see only those
aspects of the transaction relevant to counsel's opinion, not the entire
transaction.
There are at least two ways to curtail externalities without necessarily
requiring counsel to examine the entire transaction. A minimalist approach,
proposed earlier in this Article,179 is to permit counsel to assume legality if the
portion of the transaction relevant to their opinion is lawful and, in the course
of preparing due diligence for their opinion, such counsel do not spot warning
signs putting them on notice of problems. Where counsel do spot warning
signs, they should investigate further before issuing their opinion. 180 The logic
of this approach is its pragmatic balancing of costs and benefits.
In that context, the scope and the purpose of any such investigation
should be limited. Opining counsel cannot feasibly investigate for fraud in the
way that a district attorney would investigate. That investigation-normally
performed by litigators-would be time consuming and expensive, and no
client would pay for its cost. Rather, opining counsel should investigate
sufficiently to see if the warning sign, which may well be ambiguous, can be
dispelled and the requested opinion given. If the warning sign cannot be
dispelled, or if other warning signs emerge, the lawyer should decline to give
the opinion and, in appropriate circumstances, withdraw from the
representation. 181 Whether the lawyer also should have some duty to inform
government regulators is beyond the scope of this Article. 182
This approach is tied, of course, to the need to defme what constitutes
warning signS.183 It would be too limiting for this Article, in a vacuum of fact,
to attempt to supply that definition. Because warning signs are more easily
recognized than defined, the defmition should develop on a case-by-case
basis. 184 For exarnple, a refusal by in-house counsel to issue a requested no179. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
180. See supra text accompanying note 91 (proposing this approach).
181. Cf Coffee, supra note 84, at 1297, 1302-10 (arguing that securities lawyers should
function as "gatekeepers"-a role borne by "independent professionals who are so positioned that,
if they withhold their consent, approval, or rating, the corporation may be unable to effect some
transaction or to maintain some desired status"-when they detect problems with a corporation's
securities disclosure); Small, supra note 75, at 1199 (arguing that when an attorney is "on notice of
facts which, if inquired into, would disclose that he could not render an opinion, he may be guilty of
such recklessness that his activities [in rendering a legal opinion] should be proscribed even if he
was not a conscious or knowing participant in a violation ofiaw").
182. See, e.g., Valerie Breslin & Jeff Dooley, Whistle Blowing v. Confidentiality: Can
Circumstances Mandate Attorneys to Expose Their Clients?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719 (2002)
(outlining the controversy surrounding noisy withdrawal in the legal field).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
184. This approach follows the judicial litmus test of "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Supreme Court adopted a similar test
for adjudicating pornography cases. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (inquiring
"whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the
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violation-of-Iaw opinion l85 certainly should constitute a warning sign. So too
should a request that opining counsel make an apparently unreasonable
assumption. 186 The existence of undisclosed side agreements is another clear
warning sign. 187 Although failure to see a business purpose in a transaction
also might be a warning sign,188 that devolves on what constitutes a business
purpose. Raising financing or reducing its cost should always be a good
business purpose. 189 So too should shifting risk on assets to outside
investors l90 or diversifying a company's funding sources. l9l Mitigating taxes
often has been viewed as a legitimate business purpose.l 92 At least until
recently, it even could be argued that achieving an accounting treatment
permitted by GAAP is itself a legitimate business purpose.1 93 Courts should
also exercise caution against fmding warning signs where none exist. Thus, as
previously discussed,194 the fact that a structured-finance transaction has loanlike economics should not itself constitute a warning sign.
Another approach that curtails externalities without requiring counsel
issuing the structured-finance opinion to examine the entire transaction is to
supplement the minimalist approach by an additional requirement: counsel
should obtain, in appropriate cases and as part of their due diligence, an
opinion from other counsel to the originator-typically in-house counsel-that
the overall transaction does not violate law (a "no-violation-of-Iaw"

work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest" (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476,489 (1957»).
185. See infra text accompanying note 195.
186. Cf United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that once an
accountant has reason to believe that a basic assumption is false, the accountant must "extend his
procedures to determine whether or not [his] suspicions are justified").
187. See, e.g., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Comm. of the Board of
Directors of Enron Corp. 41-42,49-50,52 (Feb. 1,2002) (observing that the financing structure
Enron created for the Chewco SPY was at least 50% short of the required third-party equity needed
for accounting nonconsolidation because a portion of such equity was protected by undisclosed
reserve accounts funded by Enron).
188. See, e.g., Richard Acello, Enron Lawyers in the Hot Seat, 90 A.B.A. J. 22, 23 (June 2004)
('''If a lawyer can't come up with a good business reason for what she is doing, the lesson [of
Enron] is to think twice about it.'" (quoting Shaun Martin, legal ethics professor at University of
San Diego».
189. See Schwarcz, Enron, supra note 10, at 1315 (distinguishing lawful securitization, aimed
at obtaining lower cost financing through disintermediation, from unlawful balance-sheet
manipUlation).
190. See id.
191. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 10, at 143 (discussing diversification as one of many
benefits of asset securitization).
192. Chamberlin v. Comm'r, 207 F.2d 462,468,470-71 (6th Cir. 1953).
193. A recent SEC staff report criticizes that business purpose. See infra note 280. But cf
Schwarcz, Enron, supra note 10, at 1315 (differentiating securitization used to keep debts off a
company's balance sheet from Enron's use ofSPVs).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
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opinion). 195 Thus, structured-fmance counsel may assume legality if: (i) the
portion of the transaction relevant to their opinion is lawful; (ii) counsel obtain
a no-violation-of-Iaw opinion from in-house counsel; and (iii) counsel (in the
course of preparing the remaining due diligence for their opinion) do not spot
warning signs that put them on notice of problems. Where counsel do spot
warning signs, they should investigate further before issuing their opinion.
This Article is agnostic as to whether the minimalist approach should
always be supplemented through a no-violation-of-Iaw opinion. Requiring
such an opinion, even from in-house counsel, can be costlyl96 and would not be
a panacea. 197 Imposing such a requirement would also be inconsistent to some
extent with the existing norm that companies generally have no obligation to
retain counsel when engaging in business transactions. Even absent that
requirement, however, structured-finance counsel sometimes may want the
additional assurance provided by a no-violation-of-Iaw opinion.
Irrespective of the approach selected, transactions that are lawful today
sometimes might be suspect tomorrow. I next examine what lawfulness means
in a world of changing laws and norms.

4. What Should Lawfulness Mean in a World of Changing Laws and
Norms?-Lawfulness ultimately derives from a society's norms, and norms
change in response to changing conditions. Where positive law reflects
existing norms, lawfulness should be clear. But where there are disconnects

195. Cf Silverado Report, supra note 50, at 210-12 (defining and commenting on the scope of
this type of opinion). In appropriate cases, opining counsel might also want to ask for a "due
authorization" opinion stating that the transaction in question has been duly authorized. Easier
Path, supra note 42, at 1912-14.
196. See FITzGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 44, § 13.2.1, at 429 (noting that issuing a noviolation-of-Iaw opinion covering alllaws could take "weeks of work by a team of lawyers").
197. At least under today's customary practice (as codified in ABA guidelines), no-violationof-law opinions are viewed as covering only "law ... that, given the nature of the transaction and
the parties to it, a lawyer in the relevant jurisdiction exercising customary diligence would
reasonably recognize as being applicable." TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50, at 662.
Furthermore, unless explicitly agreed, these opinions are viewed (again, under today's customary
practice as codified in ABA guidelines) as excluding examination of certain laws that may be
clearly applicable. GLAZER & FITZGIBBON, supra note 63, § 13.2.2.7, at 457-58 (observing that
some lawyers ordinarily consider the antitrust, securities, insolvency, and tax laws excludable from
examination unless explicitly addressed). Although delivery of a no-violation-of-Iaw opinion might
well imply that opining counsel is unaware of other legal problems (including problems in the
excluded areas of law), some might argue that any such inference is inappropriate in the absence of
due diligence. See Telephone Interview with Donald W. Glazer, Co-chair, TriBar Opinion
Committee, in Durham, N.C. (June 20, 2005) (observing that lawyers cannot make responsible
judgments, even regarding negative assurance, without going through some process of diligence).
Cf Special Report of the Task Force on Securities Law Opinions, ABA Section of Business Law,
Negative Assurance in Securities Offerings, 59 Bus. LAW. 1513, 1515 (2004) (observing that
"[I]awyers customarily provide negative assurance in connection with [securities] offerings based
on their review, within the limited time available, of the offering document and the documents
incorporated by reference, as supplemented by their knowledge of the Company's affairs gained in
prior representation").
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between posItIve law and nonns or disconnects between the positive law
applicable at the time an opinion is given and the time of an adjudication (i.e.,
disconnects over time), lawfulness may be ambiguous.
Disconnects between positive law and nonns can occur in one of two
ways. At the time an opinion is given, the transaction (or portion thereof that
should be examined) can comply with either positive law but not nonns, or
nonns but not positive law. 198 In the fIrst case, lawyers theoretically should
have the right to issue opinions that help facilitate those transactions. The
rationale is that lawyers and opinion recipients must rely on objective
standards, and the existence of positive law is such a standard. 199 Nonns, in
contrast, represent what the law should be, which is often unsettled if not
controversial. This Article, for example, makes nonnative claims with which,
I anticipate, some may disagree.
In practice, though, it is risky to issue opinions to help facilitate
transactions that violate nonns. Even where those nonns are not yet
incorporated into positive law, issuing these opinions just looks bad. That, in
tum, can lead to reputational loss-such as when the transaction is scrutinized
by a Congressional committee or in the press as the poster child for why the
law should be changed. Issuing these opinions may also tempt some judges,
where the public suffers losses, to apply a flawed syllogism. The public is
hanned. These opinions are a sine qua non of the harm, and lawyers are the
only deep pockets.z°o Therefore, lawyers should be liable for the harm.
Issuing opinions to help facilitate transactions that violate nonns, even where
lawful, is unwise.
Turning now to the second disconnect, lawyers clearly should have no
right to render opinions that help facilitate transactions that comply with nonns
but not positive law. The rationale is, again, that lawyers and opinion
recipients must rely on objective standards.z° 1 Positive law provides such a
198. The remaining permutations occur when, at the time the opinion is given, the transaction
complies with both norms and positive law, or neither norms nor positive law. When a transaction
complies with neither norms nor positive law, it is patently unlawful; lawyers then should have no
right to help facilitate it (by issuing opinions or otherwise). When a transaction complies with both
norms and positive law, it might appear that lawyers have a clear right to facilitate it. Even then,
however, I show that lawyers may be criticized and, wrongly, subjected to liability. See infra text
accompanying notes 217-31 (discussing retroactive application oflaw).
199. William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprndence (I): What Was it Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U.
PA. L. REv. 1889, 2123 (1995) (discussing why lawyers typically rely upon black-letter rules of
positive law).
200. Cf JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULA nON 346
(2d ed. 1997) (suggesting that "large [law] firms [are] the most appealing targets because they have
the deepest pockets"); Nathan Koppel, Partial Protection-Plaintiffs Face a Supreme Court Barrier
When Suing Law Firms for Fraud, AM. LAW., July 2004, at 77 ("Law firms are an alluring deep
pocket for defrauded investors."); see also Lipson, supra note 60, at 5 ("A number of the lawyers
interviewed for this project said that they thought that lawyers were becoming increasingly
attractive targets when transactions fail, and that opinion letters would form an important link in the
chain leading to liability.").
201. Ewald, supra note 199, at 2123.
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standard; norms do not. Thus, even though the legal and ethical constraints
that allowed the opinions in Enron reflected the norms of that time-an
"adversary stance of companies toward regulation and regulators,,,202 the
increased competition among law fIrms for client business,203 and the thendominance "of the cults of market economism and shareholder-wealthmaximization as supreme goods,,204-lawyers should not have given those
opinions if the transactions they facilitated violated positive law. 20s
These disconnects between positive law and norms can be relatively easy
cases compared to disconnects over time. Sometimes a transaction complies
with positive law when the opinion is given (ex ante), but positive law
thereafter changes to make the transaction unlawful. The question then arises:
Did counsel have the right to issue that opinion? The obvious response is yes,
especially where the transaction complied, ex ante, with norms as well as
positive law. Some precedents, however, are troubling. There are two
scenarios: one where ex post positive law is not-and the more troublesome
scenario where ex post positive law is-viewed as retroactive.
The fIrst scenario, where ex post positive law is not viewed as retroactive,
is the more common. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides an example. As
mentioned, the norms governing transactions prior to the Enron and
WorldCom scandals included an adversary stance of companies toward
regulation and regulators and a dominance of market economism and shareholder wealth maximization?06 After those and other corporate failures,
however, investor confIdence in markets needed to be re-established. That
confIdence required a showing that "leadership knows what it is doing and that
rational [people] are handling the nation's businesses rationally.,,207
Government attempted to accomplish this showing by enacting SarbanesOxley,208 which subjects businesses to more stringently protective laws and
standards for behavior. 209 This type of reaction is typical, as illustrated by the
enactment of the federal securities laws in response to the Great Depression of

202. Gordon, supra note 78, at 1209.
203. Id.
204. Id. Professor Gordon argues that these factors eviscerated the "statesman-advisor" norm
of lawyering, discussed supra note 78.
205. This second disconnect between positive law and norms creates a temptation, of course, to
test the boundaries of positive law. Lawyers ought to have the right to do that, so long as those
boundaries are not actually violated.
206. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
207. 'ADAM SMITH', THE MONEY GAME 236-37 (1968).
208. See supra note 16.
209. Likewise, corporations and other private parties themselves may attempt to increase
market confidence by changing the norms by which they behave. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 26,
at 413 ("In an age when the chief executive officer of the world's largest corporation feels
compelled to make a public apology to a private citizen, it is only natural that members of a
profession historically vested with a public trust be held to a standard of accountability that
accurately reflects the tenor of the times.").
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1929-1933;210 the aggressive enforcing of existing laws, especially against
individuals, in response to the National Student Marketing debacle of the
1970s;211 and the enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREAiI2 in response to the savings and loan
failures of the 1980s.
Although Sarbanes-Oxley clearly codifies changing norms into positive
law, it does not appear to make its standards retroactive. A recent court
decision confirms that view, at least in the context of retroactively extending
certain statutes of limitation.213 Section 804 of Sarbanes-Oxley creates a new
five-year statute of limitations for private securities-fraud cases, and plaintiffs
claimed that § 804 retroactively extended their lapsed, shorter statutes of
limitation?14 The court disagreed, reasoning that neither the language of that
section nor legislative history suggests that Congress intended retroactive
application. 215
The second, and more troublesome, disconnect over time occurs where ex
post positive law is viewed as retroactive?16 Unlike retroactive criminal laws,
which (at least in the United States and the European Union) are invalid,217
retroactive non-criminal law is often upheld. 2I8 This is true even under
international legal principles, so long as the retroactive law is non210. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) ("The primary purpose of
the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities
market."); JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 3 (3d ed. 2001) ("[T]he Great
Depression and the market collapse in October 1929 ... provided the political momentum for
congressional action that would over the course of a decade produce a collection of acts known as
the federal securities laws. ").
211. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 26, at 414 (observing that to "bolster confidence in the
securities markets" after that debacle, the SEC took enforcement action against individuals to
"impress[] corporate managements and their advisors with the magnitude of their responsibilities
under the securities laws and with the potential for personal and professional humiliation as a
penalty for failure to discharge those responsibilities").
212. Pub. L. No. 101-73,103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.c.).
213. In re Enter. Mortgage Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401,406 (2d Cir. 2004).
214. Id. at 403.
215. Id. at 406-08.
216. Conceptually, this is most likely to occur (but is not limited to situations) when there is a
retrospective disconnect between positive law and norms, so that ex post positive law reflects ex
ante norms. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil
Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2158 (1996) ("Retroactivity enhances the ability of a
current majority to fashion policies responsive to contemporary interests.").
217. Retroactive, or ex post facto, criminal laws violate Article I, Sections 9 and 10, of the U.S.
Constitution. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 389-91 (1798) (holding that only criminal, not civil,
ex post facto laws violate the Constitution). They also generally violate Section I, Article 7, of the
European Convention on Human Rights. Restrictions on ex post facto criminal law are sometimes
referred to as nulla poena sine lege ("no penalty without a law").
218. See, e.g., Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,267 (1994) (explaining that, absent a
violation of a specific Constitutional provision, "the potential unfairness of retroactive civil
legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope"); Krent,
supra note 216, at 2149 ("The Court has generally sustained any retroactive enactment in the
economic sphere that is supported by a plausible public purpose.").
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discriminatory.219 Retroactivity can be implicit or explicit, although the former
has no clear legal basis. 22o
The practical problem with retroactive law, of course, is that parties
violating it cannot know, at the time of their action, of the violation. Even
where parties sense they may be violating norms, that is not per se unlawful. 221
In a business and financial context, if not in other contexts, retroactive laws
therefore undermine the certainty and objectivity needed to structure
transactions. 222
Moreover, where the retroactive law concerns a politically sensitive topic
there is potential for abuse. 223 Consider, for example, the much-criticized
regulatory action taken, under FIRREA, by the U.S. Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) against the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler?24 Kaye, Scholer had been retained as litigation counsel for Lincoln
Savings & Loan Association in an adversarial relationship with the OTS. 225
Lincoln subsequently failed, being $2.6 billion insolvent. 226 Almost two years
later, the OTS filed its regulatory action against Kaye, Scholer, alleging
essentially that the law firm failed to disclose Lincoln's actual financial

219. See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 918-21 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (discussing retroactivity in the context of expropriation and confiscation,
and concluding that it is permitted so long as it is neither discriminatory nor arbitrary).
220. For an example of dubiously legal implicit retroactivity, see infra notes 224-31 and
accompanying text (discussing the OTS case against Kaye, Scholer).
221. Cf supra note 216 (noting that retroactive lawmaking most likely occurs when there is a
retrospective disconnect between positive law and norms, so that ex post positive law reflects ex
ante norms).
222. See, e.g., George Clemon Freeman, Jr., A Public Policy Essay: Superfund Retroactivity
Revisited, 50 BuS. LAW. 663, 682-83 (1995) ("The key to continuing investments in productive
enterprises, and to the availability of insurance to facilitate those investments, is predictability.
Predictability in turn is dependent upon a stable legal system where those who must make decisions
on whether or not to act or how to act, and those who must decide whether or not to insure them and
if so at what price, can do so with fairly accurate knowledge of the likely legal
consequences .... Retroactive legislation ... is antithetical to predictability.").
223. This potential for abuse to some extent reflects the previously discussed flawed syllogism:
The public is harmed; legal opinions are a sine qua non of the harm, and the opining lawyers are the
only deep pockets; therefore, those lawyers should be liable for the harm. See supra note 200 and
accompanying text. Objectively, however, lawyers should not be liable if the transactions they
opined on did not violate positive law when their opinions were given. See supra note 199 and
accompanying text. But see Freeman, supra note 26, at 375 (observing that, in 1973, "times have
changed" and thus "[r]esponsibilities that were never recognized previously have now come into
view"); id. at 376 (contending that "as attorneys come to be idealized as the 'due diligence men' and
the 'corporate conscience,' they must expect that the changing times will require of them a stricter
accountability for their actions") (citations omitted).
224. The author discloses that he was a partner of Kaye, Scholer at the time of this regulatory
action, though not at the time Kaye, Scholer engaged in any actions alleged to be problematic. The
author therefore was not involved in the regulatory action.
225. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 200, at 341.
226. HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 419 (1999) (quoting James O. Johnston & Daniel S. Schecter, Kaye, Scholer and the
OTS-Did Anyone Go Too Far?, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 977,979-83 (1993)).
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condition to the OTS's predecessor.227 Kaye, Scholer countered that it had no
such disclosure duty, and indeed that the OTS's charge was a "completely
groundless ... attempt ... to create and apply new standard's [sic] for attorney
conduct that are different from, and inconsistent with, generally accepted
professional standards and ethical obligations for lawyers representing a
client.,,228 The OTS, in response, claimed that FIRREA retroactively imposes
on a bank's counsel a duty to regulators as well as to the clienr 29 and that
Kaye, Scholer should have complied with that duty when representing
Lincoln-even though it was not then law.230
This controversy was settled and never adjudicated on the merits.231
Commentators, however, see it as emblematic of politicized abuse of
retroactive law by the highest levels of govemment. 232
227. Id. at 419-20.
228. Id. at 420.
229. Under FIRREA, attorneys advising federally insured depository institutions are regarded
as "institution-affiliated parties." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u) (2005). The OTS, under its then-Chief
Counsel Harris Weinstein, relied in part on that provision to conclude that such attorneys owe, and
retrospectively have owed, a fiduciary obligation to those institutions. Joseph E. Addiego, III,
Comment, FIRREA Disrupts Traditional Notions of Attorney Duty by Exposing Lawyers, as
Financial Institution-Affiliated Parties, to Personal Liability, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 969, 971
(1993); see also id. at 973 (observing that "[t]he passage ofFIRREA changed, or at least modified,
the existing law regarding attorneys' fiduciary duties"); id. at 978 ("By including attorneys as
institution-affiliated parties, FIRREA exposes attorneys to personal liability when a depository
fails.").
230. The author states this from personal experience as a Kaye, Scholer partner at that time.
231. Kaye, Scholer did not have the opportunity to contest the OTS's action because, in
connection with the action, the OTS froze the law firm's assets without opportunity for a prior
hearing. The OTS imposed the freeze by issuing a temporary cease-and-desist order under 12
U.S.C. § 1818(b}-(c). JAcKSON & SYMONS, supra note 226, at 421. Some question the OTS's
authority to even issue this order. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULA nON OF
BANK. FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTMTIES 640 (2004) (noting the allegation of one academic that the
temporary cease-and-desist order was issued by the OTS to "bludgeon [Kaye, Scholer] so they
wouldn't have to prove the allegations" against the firm). Kaye, Scholer had no realistic choice but
to settle immediately: any administrative hearing probably would have taken months. See JACKSON
& SYMONS, supra note 226, at 421 (noting that administrative hearings commonly drag on for
months). Moreover, the law firm's banks-as a result of the OTS's regulatory action-had declared
a material adverse change, suspending the firm's lines of credit needed to pay salaries and other
current expenses. The author states this from personal experience as a Kaye, Scholer partner at that
time.
232. See, e.g., JACKSON & SYMONS, supra note 226, at 420. Jackson and Symons quote
Professor Geoffrey Hazard, a leading legal-ethics expert, noting:
Kaye, Scholer did not violate existing standards of ethical conduct and professional
responsibility, and Kaye, Scholer acted in accord with its duties under the law. The
disclosures and representations that the OTS alleges should have been made by Kaye,
Scholer in fact would have violated the standards of ethical conduct and professional
responsibility generally recognized in its role as litigation counsel.
Id.; see also MACEY & MILLER, supra note 200, at 345 ("Wasn't it particularly unfair for the OTS
to take after Kaye, Scholer without giving formal advance warning that it intended to hold law firms
representing thrift institutions to a different standard than the traditional standard of adversary
representation in which law firms have traditionally engaged? ... [By] targeting lawyers, the OTS
managed to do battle with a group even less popular than itself and to create the impression that it
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For these reasons-the potential for abuse and the lack of certainty and
objectivity needed to structure business and financial transactionsretroactivity should be frowned on. Even more so in the context of legal
opinions, retroactivity should not be used as a basis to impose liability on
opining lawyers.233 Opining lawyers, unlike companies relying on their
advice, are professionals. As such, they are not (at least under today's norms)
the ultimate guarantors of legality but, instead, experts in a learned body of
knowledge. 234 If that knowledge later changes-and especially if it changes
unpredictably-the lawyer would still have complied with all professional
obligations when rendering the opinion. That is all a lawyer can do.235 Legal
opinions, and the lawyers giving them, therefore should not be criticized solely
because a change in positive law makes the transaction opined on retroactively
unlawful.

5. Statement of the Framework. -Having resolved these ancillary issues,
it is now possible to articulate the complete normative framework. Lawyers
should have the right to issue opinions that help facilitate lawful structuredfinance transactions. By "lawful," I mean that neither the lawyer's opiniongiving nor, to the extent set forth below, the transaction being opined on is
illegal or unethical as a matter of positive law-nor, ideally, do they violate
[the OTS] was not to blame for the continuing crisis in the banking industry."); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Kaye, Scholer, FIRREA, and the Desirability of Early Closure: A View of the
Kaye, Scholer Case From the Perspective of Bank Regulatory Policy, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. IllS,

1138 (1993) (concluding that the OTS took its regulatory action because it "needed a convenient,
unpopular scapegoat that it could confront with a dramatic gesture designed to help it regain its
prestige").
233. Recall that this Article uses the term "liability" to include any form of governmental
constraints, including civil liability, criminal liability, and suspension or termination of the license
to practice law. See supra note 128.
234. See Guidelines, supra note 50, at 875 (stating that opinions serve to "provid[e] the
recipient with the opinion giver's professional judgment on legal issues concerning the opinion
giver's client, the transaction, or both, that the recipient has determined to be important in
connection with the transaction"); Legal Opinion PrinCiples, supra note 62, at 832 (maintaining that
legal opinions are "expressions of professional judgment regarding the legal matters addressed and
not guarantees that a court will reach any particular result"). Cf Easier Path, supra note 42, at 1896
(stating that "it should be understood that an opinion is not a guaranty, but merely a lawyer's
informed judgment as to a specific question oflaw").
235. As a practical matter, legal opinions sometimes explicitly state that they are limited to the
law in effect on the date the opinion is given. Cf STERBA, supra note 51, § 2.13 ("[S]ome lawyers
wiJI state in their opinions that they 'assume no responsibility to communicate with you with
reference to changes which may occur subsequent to the date hereof.'''). Although primarily
intended to put the opinion recipient on notice that counsel has no duty to update the opinion if the
law changes, this statement in an opinion would also have the incidental benefit of clarifying,
essentially as a matter of contract, that counsel is not responsible for a later retroactive change in
law. Id; see also TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50, at 662 (with respect to no-violation-of-law
opinions, "the opinion covers only those laws (including published rules and regulations) in effect
on the date of the opinion letter and laws and published rules and regulations adopted on that date
that by their terms are to take effect while the Company is performing its obligations under the
agreement").
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nonns-at the time the opinion is issued. 236 In assessing whether a transaction
is lawful, the lawyer should examine at least the portion of the transaction
relating to the opinion. If, however, in the course of that examination the
lawyer spots warning signs, the lawyer should investigate further before
issuing the opinion. What constitutes a warning sign should be decided by
courts on a case-by-case basis because warning signs are more easily
recognized than defined. In appropriate cases, the lawyer may want to obtain,
as part of the due diligence investigation, an opinion from in-house counsel
stating that the overall transaction does not violate law. Failure of in-house
counsel to render such an opinion would signal a problem.
Is this framework, which imposes relatively minimal constraints on
structured-fmance opinions and the lawyers issuing them, preferable to
potentially more restrictive frameworks? In the post-Enron regulatory
environment, for example, scholars have vigorously criticized lawyer conduct,
suggesting the need for greater constraints. 237 My analysis, however,
implicitly has demonstrated that this framework is superior to, or at least
equally efficient as, other potential frameworks. Structured-finance opinions
are an efficient means of facilitating lawful structured-fmance transactions.238
Lawful structured-finance transactions are themselves, on balance, efficient,
The only deficiency in these
fair, and economically desirable.239
transactions--occasional infonnation failure--occurs independent of lawyer
conduct and has solutions that are likewise independent. 240 Therefore, any
framework for issuing structured-fmance opinions that imposes greater
constraints on lawyer conduct than this Article's framework would impose
costs that yield no real benefit.
Moreover, as vigorously as scholars have criticized lawyer conduct,241 the
scholarship often does not propose actual legal constraints on, but merely

236. Where the transaction being opined on is lawful as a matter of positive law but nonetheless
may violate norms, the lawyer may want to exercise special caution in issuing the opinion.
237. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
238. See text accompanying supra note 125 (discussing that these opinions facilitate structuredfinance transactions in an efficient way by targeting the precise two elements of information
asymmetry of concern to investors); see also supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing
why the scope of due diligence proposed by this Article's framework is optimal); supra notes 17998 (same).
239. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 153-73 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 150, at 1252 (condemning a system of legal ethics that
"enabled lawyers to become complicitous in client actions that defrauded the public"); Koniak,
supra note I, at 1240 (alleging that "the involvement of lawyers was necessary to implement"
various aspects of corporate fraud); see also Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of
Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507, 557 (1994) (suggesting that by
ignoring the moral interdependence between lawyers and clients, lawyers "further entangle
themselves in clients' moral quagmires and [may] expose themselves to legal liability as well").
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aspirational goals for, such conduct. 242 And where the scholarship does
propose legal constraints, they are often impracticae43 and not demonstrably
preferable to this Article's framework, which, by following the social-ordering
paradigm, should achieve an optimal public outcome overall. 244
I next illustrate the framework's application by examining several
different hypothetical scenarios. In that context, I also examine how the
framework would apply when the assumption that the legal opinion is correct
is relaxed.

6. Applying the Framework.-Consider ftrst how this Article's
framework would apply to a technically correct structured-fmance opinion
delivered in a pre-Sarbanes-Oxley transaction, which subsequently collapses,
leaving shareholders of the originator with huge losses as a result of contingent
recourse that wipes out most of their equity. Because lawyers should have the
right to issue opinions that help facilitate structured-ftnance transactions that
are neither illegal nor unethical as a matter of positive law at the time the
opinion is issued, this opinion should not be subject to criticism, and the
lawyer issuing it should not be subject to liability. Notwithstanding the
shareholders' losses, lawyers are not, and should not be, ultimate guarantors of
a transaction's success. 245
The foregoing assumes that the lawyer examined at least the portion of
the transaction relating to the opinion. If, however, in the course of that
examination the lawyer spotted appropriate warning signs, such as in-house
counsel's failure to render a requested no-violation-of-Iaw opinion, and did not
investigate further, the lawyer should be subject to criticism if not liabilitynotwithstanding the structured-ftnance opinion being technically correct.
The same analysis would apply to a technically correct structured-ftnance
opinion delivered in a post-Sarbanes-Oxley transaction, which subsequently
collapses, leaving shareholders of the originator with huge losses as a result of
contingent recourse that wipes out most of their equity. Even though, as
discussed below,246 Sarbanes-Oxley might impose securities law liability for

242. See Painter, supra note 241, at 511-18 (arguing that, at least as a moral matter, lawyers
sometimes should second guess their corporate clients).
243. Compare Griffith, supra note ISO, at 1232 (arguing that a lawyer should be responsible for
seeking outcomes that "are optimal from the perspective of the public generally, not merely from a
particular client's point of view"), with id. at 1233 (admitting that his proposal "seem[s] a bit
abstract"). Although Professor Griffith subsequently argues that his proposal could be applied to an
actual case by having investors stand in for the "public," the example he uses appears internally
inconsistent as to whether those investors are investors in the originator or the SPY. Id. at 1237-39.
244. Under that paradigm, parties left to independent bargaining work out arrangements that,
except to the extent the arrangements create unlawful externalities, overall benefit the social good.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. Cf TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50, at 596
("An opinion is not a guaranty ofan outcome, but rather an expression of professional judgment.").
246. See infra notes 254-64 and accompanying text.
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mere negligence, the hypothetical assumes that the structured-finance opinion
is technically correct; thus, there is no negligence. The opining lawyer
therefore will not, and-because lawyers are not ultimate guarantors of a
transaction's success-should not, be liable. Shareholders nonetheless may be
able to recover losses from the originator's officers and directors to the extent
the contingent recourse was fraudulently concealed. 247
Now relax the framework's assumption that the legal opinion is
technically correct. For this purpose, again break the analysis into two parts:
an incorrect structured-fmance opinion delivered in a pre-Sarbanes-Oxley
transaction, and one delivered in a post-Sarbanes-Oxley transaction. In both
cases, I will assume that opining counsel intended to give a correct opinion but
·
248
was neg1Igent.
In the former case,249 the framework itself need not change, even though
it was constructed under the assumption that the opinion is correct. The
framework only need recognize existing liability standards for rendering
incorrect opinions. Negligence law, and lawyer liability thereunder, provide a
significant incentive to motivate opining counsel to strive for a correct
opinion. 25o Reputational cost provides an important additional incentive.251 In
cases where these incentives fail, damages assessed against opining counsel
ought to compensate the originator's shareholders for any losses resulting from
the incorrect opinion. 252

247. See infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text (discussing § 303 ofSarbanes-Oxley).
248. Where opining counsel intends to give an incorrect opinion, the inherent fraud is obviously
problematic (and beyond the scope of this Article).
249. This case assumes, as discussed in text accompanying supra note 215, that SarbanesOxley is not retroactive.
250. One commentator argues:
[T]he real value added by the threat oflegalliability may be (or at least has been) in
terrorem, and not directly traceable to actual cases holding lawyers liable. "[T]he fact
that there aren't a lot of cases to hold lawyers liable," one attorney [being interviewed
by the commentator] observed, "and there isn't a lot of experience of lawyers being
sued, doesn't mean that people aren't fearful of it nevertheless. It's like fastening your
seatbelt on an airplane. I don't know anyone who's been through a plane crash much
less someone who has been through a crash who would not have survived if they
weren't wearing their seatbelt. Nevertheless, I buckle my belt low and firm across the
lap."
Lipson, supra note 60, at 76-77.
251. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers
and Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397, 411-12 (2004) (observing that lawyers and other professional
gatekeepers "involved in corporate scandals ... face loss of reputation, the very asset that allows
[them] to sell their services to issuers in the first place. These 'market reputation' and 'litigation'
corrections ... may be as effective as, if not more effective than, regulation"); see also Lipson,
supra note 60, at 76-77 (arguing that "it may not be rational to worry about liability, but the
conservatism engendered by anxiety ultimately produces better quality practice" and "[t]he fact that
the opinion creates the potential for liability takes up slack that might otherwise plague a lawyered
transaction").
252. See supra note 148.
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In the latter case (an incorrect structured-finance opinion delivered in a
post-Sarbanes-Oxley transaction), this same rationale should apply even more
strongly because opining counsel not only would be liable under negligence
law and subject to reputational costs but also might be liable under SarbanesOxley, which exposes counsel to securities-law penalties.253 Section 303 of
that Acf 54 directs the SEC to adopt rules making it illegal for officers and
directors of issuers of securities, or any persons acting under their direction, to
"fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead" any independent
public or certified accountant auditing the issuer's financial statements "for the
purpose of rendering such fmancial statements materially misleading.,,255 The
SEC consequently issued Rule 13b2_2,256 which provides in relevant part that
"[n]o ... person acting under the direction [of an issuer's officers or directors]
shall directly or indirectly take any action to ... mislead" any such accountant
"if that person knew or should have known that such action, if successful,
could result in rendering the issuer's fmancial statements materially
misleading.,,257 The SEC Release accompanying issuance of that rule makes it
clear that persons acting under such direction could, in appropriate
circumstances, include attorneys,258 and even could include attorneys who
merely negligently issue "an inaccurate or misleading legal analysis" on which
any such accountant is permitted to rely.259 This means that an attorney
negligently issuing an inaccurate true sale or nonconsolidation opinion might
be violating Rule 13b2-2 if an accountant is allowed to rely on that opinion to
fmd, under GAAP, that the transaction in question is off-balance-sheet.

253. Penalties under Rule 13b2-2, which implements Sarbanes-Oxley § 303, include ceaseand-desist orders, injunctions, and civil or criminal penalties. See, e.g., In re John K. Bradley,
Exchange Act Release No. 46035 (June 5, 2002), 2002 SEC LEXIS 1448 (imposing a § 21C ceaseand-desist order).
254. Section 303 is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7242 (2005).
255. 15 U.S.C. § 7242(a).
256. 17 C.F .R. § 240.13b2-2 (2005).
257. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b)(1).
258. Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, Exchange Act Release No. 47890 (May 20,
2003),2003 WL 21148349, at 3.
259. Id. at 4, 6. The SEC Release is somewhat ambivalent as to whether, in addition to mere
negligence, any degree of scienter will be required to violate Rule 13b2-2. See id. at 4, which notes:
[S]ome commentators noted that a misleading legal analysis should violate the rule
only if accompanied by fraudulent or 'bad' intent on the part of the attorney providing
the analysis. These comments would appear to be based on the premise that in the past
the Commission has not addressed the negligent communication of misleading
information to auditors .... To the contrary, for many years we have initiated
enforcement actions against those who, by negligently providing misleading
confirmations to auditors, cause an issuer to violate the financial reporting or books
and records provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.... We believe that
third parties providing information or analyses to an auditor should exercise reasonable
attention and care in those communications [although] [w]e do not intend to hold any
party accountable for honest and reasonable mistakes.
(citations omitted; emphasis added).
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In a sense, § 303 of Sarbanes-Oxley illustrates this Article's contention
that where lawyers facilitate lawful transactions that create problematic
externalities, the focus should be on legally prohibiting those transactions. 26o
Section 303 effectively declares unlawful, as a matter of positive law, misleading off-balance-sheet transactions. Rule 13b2-2 might be viewed as
undercutting that contention, though, to the extent it imposes securities-law
penalties on lawyers that merely negligently facilitate misleading off-balancesheet transactions. I believe, however, that Rule 13b2-2 may go too far.
Although the Rule's higher securities-law penalty arguably will motivate
lawyers to increase their due diligence when issuing structured-fmance
opinions, these opinions are rarely incorrecr 61 because negligence law and
reputational cost already significantly motivate opining counsel to strive for
correct opinions. 262 Moreover, third parties injured by incorrect opinions
already should be compensated. 263 Therefore, it is unclear whether the cost of
increased due diligence is justified. 264
As a reality check, compare how the framework would apply to a
hypothetical scenario analyzed, in a separate context, by Professor Gordon. He
contends that lawyers should not facilitate client transactions that, though
"technically legal," are "likely to bring destruction in [their] wake.,,265 This
certainly appears sensible: Where a lawyer believes a transaction is likely to
bring destruction, the lawyer probably should not facilitate that transaction.
As a practical matter, however, Professor Gordon's view is not inconsistent
with this Article's framework. If the destruction is to the client itself/66 only
an immense judgment gap between management and counsel could produce a
scenario where the former believe a transaction is desirable but the latter
believes it is likely to bring destruction. And, if the destruction is to third
parties, Professor Gordon's hypothetical could arise only in a legal system in

260. Cf Blackwood, supra note 152 (arguing that LBOs should come within the purview of
fraudulent conveyance law, protecting unsecured creditors in the event that an unsuccessful LBO
ends up in bankruptcy, thereby mitigating negative externalities created by transactional lawyers
who facilitate debt-laden (and, perhaps, economically unsound) but legal LBO transactions).
261. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
264. This is true even to the extent that one argues that increased due diligence is needed,
irrespective of cost, because incorrect structured-finance opinions potentially impact large numbers
of investors and public-market integrity. Cf Freeman, supra note 26, at 418 (arguing that "the
lawyer's 'responsibility must broaden and deepen' as more individuals find it increasingly
necessary to rely upon his expertise" (quoting Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand,
491 P.2d 421, 432-33 (Cal. 1971»). Willfulness, scienter, or recklessness is normally required to
impose securities-law penalties. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)
(holding that "a private cause of action for damages will [not] lie under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in
the absence of any allegation of 'scienter' -intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud").
265. Gordon, supra note 78, at 1207.
266. This is the scenario that Gordon envisions. See id.
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which the transaction causing the destruction is neither unlawfuf 67 nor subjects
the client to liability.268 The framework therefore satisfies this reality check.
The framework also has predictive utility. Consider, for example,
whether the holding in United States v. Simon should be extended to lawyers
providing legal opinions. 269 The lawyer is not then advocating for a client but,
rather, predicting as accurately as possible the legal outcome of a given factual
scenario. The Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers even comments that a
lawyer's duty to third-party-opinion recipients "is to provide a fair and
objective opinion,,270-essentially the same standard that an accountant has in
certifying financial statements. 271 In principle, therefore, the United States v.
Simon holding should be as applicable to opining lawyers as to accountants.272
Nonetheless, this Article's framework suggests a distinction in how that
holding should apply. In contrast to an accountant whose responsibility is to
fairly present financial statements, the opining lawyer's sole duty is to present
an accurate, fair, and objective opinion on the legal matters the opinion covers.
A lawyer rendering an accurate opinion that fairly and objectively presents
those legal matters should not-absent knowledge, or the existence of warning
signs that would lead to knowledge, of the wrongful nature of the accountant's
conducr 73-be subject to liability under United States v. Simon.274
267. If the transaction is unlawful, the lawyer could not provide the requested opinion in the
first place. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
268. If the transaction subjects the client to liability, third parties could sue, thereby transferring
the costs of the destruction from them to the client. Then we would be under the remote prior
scenario, where the client's management believes a transaction is desirable but counsel believes it is
likely to bring destruction. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
269. Cf supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Simon).
270. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95 cmt. c (2000).
271. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. Cf Gordon, supra note 78, at 1194
(questioning whether corporate lawyers are truly like advocates whose duties are only to the client,
as opposed to like auditors whose duties are to the public); Painter, supra note 251, at 398 (arguing
that "[e]thics rules are becoming increasingly similar for auditors and securities lawyers," although
there are "differences").
272. Cf Freeman, supra note 26, at 389 (arguing that "it is in the rendition of formal opinions
that the services performed by the two professions [law and accounting] shade together and become
indistinguishable"-such as the role provided by a bond-counsel legal opinion, though also
cautioning that one cannot compare a legal opinion to an auditor's certification "without regard to
the setting in which the legal opinion is rendered"). Cf United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854,
863 (2d Cir. 1964) (noting that in "our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's
opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the
crowbar").
273. This Article's "knowledge" standard may well require more of the attorney than existing
positive-law ethical requirements. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 94 cmt. g (2000), which states:
[Wlhen a lawyer's state of knowledge is relevant, in the absence of circumstances
indicating otherwise, a lawyer may assume that a client will use the lawyer's counsel
for proper purposes. Mere suspicion on the part of the lawyer that the client might
intend to commit a crime or fraud is not knowledge .... [A] lawyer is not required to
make a particular kind of investigation in order to ascertain more certainly what the
facts are, although it will often be prudent for the lawyer to do so.
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To illustrate this, consider the difficult case where a lawyer renders an
accurate structured-finance opinion that fairly and objectively presents the
bankruptcy-law matters that the opinion purports to cover (true sale and
nonconsolidation), knowing that the sole purpose of the transaction is to
achieve off-balance-sheet accounting results under GAAP (and to thereby
avoid the adverse effect on stock price of the disclosure that otherwise would
take place). If this constitutes knowledge of wrongful conduct, the lawyer
should be subject to liability. There is nothing per se wrongful, however, about
a company engaging in a transaction to achieve accounting results that are
permitted under GAAP, which sets accounting standards officially recognized
as authoritative by the SEC. 275 Moreover, except as noted below,276 the fact
that a company engages in such a transaction should not, in and of itself,
constitute a warning sign if the company is advised by certified public
accountants. A lawyer ought to be able to assume that such accountants will
comply with GAAP 277 unless on notice otherwise.278 To the extent society
deems it inappropriate for companies to engage in transactions whose sole
purpose is to achieve off-balance-sheet accounting results under GAAP, the
solution-assuming reputational cost is an insufficient deterrenr 79-is either to
make those engagements unlawful or to restrict what is permitted as offbalance-sheet accounting under G~80 and not to constrain lawyers from
helping to facilitate lawful transactions.281
274. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 37, 102--03 and accompanying text. Indeed, companies routinely engage
in transactions primarily, if not solely, to achieve accounting results that are permitted under GAAP,
such as selling assets and using the proceeds to repay debt, thereby reducing leverage. See Linda A.
MacDonald, Principles-Based Approach to Standard Setting, The FASB Report, Nov. 27, 2002,
available at http://www.fasb.orglprojectlprinciples-based_approach.shtml (noting that past
accounting rules have been so detailed and rules-based as to allow financial engineering with an aim
towards achieving a desired accounting result). .
276. See infra note 280.
277. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(2)(b) (2000) (stating
that a lawyer should not be disciplined "when the lawyer reasonably believes ... that the client can
assert a nonfrivolous argument that the client's conduct will not constitute a crime or fraud"). The
client's argument in the text above would indeed be nonfrivolous: that its accounting will remain in
compliance with GAAP. See also Schwarcz, Enron, supra note 10, at 1315-17 (proposing that
even transactions designed solely to achieve accounting results should not be presumptively
unlawful).
278. That notice is unlikely to arise as a result of the lawyer's independent understanding of
GAAP because knowledge about, much less expertise in, GAAP is well beyond the learning of most
attorneys. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. The textual analysis above of course
assumes, where a transaction is facilitating fraud, that opining counsel neither knows nor reasonably
should know of the fraud. See supra notes 26, 179-94 and accompanying text.
279. To some extent, the problem will be self-correcting where reputational costs penalize
companies that engage in these transactions. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 20 & n.120
(observing this reputational cost, in the form of falling stock prices, of companies engaging in
earnings-management transactions).
280. Indeed, on June 15, 2005, the SEC staff released its report on off-balance-sheet
transactions, REpORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 401(c) OF THE SARBANESOXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL
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This approach is sensible. It respects the social-ordering paradigm while
recognizing that controlling management action is, and should be, primarily an
internal governance issue, not a general monitoring function of outside
lawyers. Corporate governance principles require management to maximize
shareholder value. To the extent transactions structured to achieve accounting
results ultimately hurt the company's shareholders, one of four things may be
happening. The transaction may have appeared, ex ante, to be positive-value
but turned out to be negative-value-a bad judgment call for which no law that
respects managerial discretion can provide complete protection and as to which
corporate-governance systems in the United States (if not abroad) generally
follow the business-judgment rule to provide managerial discretion?82 Or
management may be biased due to manufactured conflicts of interest, as in
Enron, a scenario separately addressed by the solution that management be
required to be free of material conflicts of interest stemming from complex
transactions for which disclosure may be insufficient. 283 Management also
may be biased due to the inherent conflict of interest that stock price is the
principal criterion by which management's performance is judged. This bias,
however, does not mean that accounting-motivated transactions should be
necessarily unlawful. Even though corporate governance principles require
management to maximize shareholder value, there is a temporal conflict
between current and future shareholders: disclosure of a possible risk harms a
company's current shareholders, whereas failure to disclose the risk may harm
the company's future shareholders. 284 On which audience should disclosure be
focused? Corporation law provides that management's sole duty is to current
ENTITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS,
available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/soxoffbalancerpt.pdf. The Report focused, among other things, on
whether financial statements of issuers of securities transparently reflect the economics of offbalance-sheet arrangements. Id. The Report recommended that "transactions and transaction
structures primarily motivated by accounting and reporting concerns, rather than economics" be
discouraged through a combination of changes to accounting standards by FASB and greater
awareness by participants in the financial reporting process. Id. at 3. In this latter context, the
Report suggested, consistent with the Simon case (though not citing it), that technical compliance
with financial reporting requirements would be unsatisfactory when investors are nonetheless
misled or have insufficient information to understand the issuer's activities. Id. The Report
questioned nuanced approaches to accounting disclosure because "financial structures are virtually
limitless and continue to evolve at a rapid pace." Id. at 46. Instead, it suggested that "improvement
in transparency and comparability across issuers can perhaps most directly and quickly be
accomplished by eliminating the use of such structured transactions" whose sole (or perhaps even
primary) purpose is motivated by accounting treatment. Id.
281. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
282. See In re Abbott Labs Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 805 (7th Cir. 2003)
("Where there is no conflict of interest or no facts suggesting suspect motivation, it is difficult to
charge directors with responsibility for corporate losses for an alleged breach of care. ").
283. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
284. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between
Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1044 (2005) (discussing this temporal conflict).
Future shareholders could be harmed if, after they purchase their shares, the undisclosed risk occurs,
causing share prices to fall.
PURPOSE
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shareho1ders;285 they, unlike future shareholders, would likely benefit from
accounting-motivated transactions. 286
Where, however, management is simply defrauding shareholders, there
are far more systematic monitors than opining counsel (though any opining
counsel that becomes aware of the fraud would, of course, have to report it). 287
In-house counsel are in a better position to monitor because they generally
have more information about the company and its business goals 288 and also
because, as employees, they are not normally engaged to work only on discrete
transactions. 289 Many in-house legal staffs have attorneys specifically
dedicated to corporate compliance with law?90 The company's accountants, of
course, also serve as additional monitors. 291
This is not to say that opining counsel should not act as monitors. To the
extent discussed/ 92 they should serve as monitors of transactional lawfolness,
285. Id. at 1049 (demonstrating that "[d]irectors and management, at least in the United States,
have a fiduciary duty only to investors holding an existing property right or equitable interest to
support such a duty-i.e., current investors" (citing Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del.
1988))) (emphasis added).
286. This responds, solely for illustrative purposes, to a nonnative question (on which audience
should disclosure be focused?) with a positive-law answer. In this context, I recognize that federal
securities law, which would preempt inconsistent state corporation law, sometimes may impose
duties to future as well as current shareholders. See Schwarcz, supra note 284. So long as
management is able to certify fair presentation under § 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley, however, I am
unaware of any securities-law precedent that would make it unlawful for management to engage in a
GAAP-pennitted transaction. I also would be skeptical of any such precedent so long as GAAP
rules are promulgated pursuant to SEC delegation of power. See supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
287. See supra notes 98, 179-94 and accompanying text.
288. Once upon a time, outside counsel were, for the most part, both corporate and transactional
counsel. Lawyers working on corporate matters then would work hand in hand with, or sometimes
be the same as, the lawyers working on transactions. As legal fees have risen, companies have
brought the more routine corporate counsel work in-house and engage outside finns primarily, ifnot
exclusively, for sophisticated transactional work. See, e.g., James S. Wilbur, The Inside Track to
Cost Containment, AM. LAW., Dec. 1990, at 40 (observing that "toward the end of the 1980s general
counsel ... add[ed] lawyers to in-house staffs and [limited] the amount and types of legal matters
being referred outside").
289. Indeed, at the March 21,2005 Columbia Law School Symposium on this Article, Sullivan
& Cromwell Partner Rebecca Simmons observed that a strong intemallegal department can help to
see the overall picture and ensure that all the advice is coherent.
290. See In-House Counsel Must Lead Corporate Compliance Efforts, II CORP. LEGAL TIMES,
Issue 114, at 18 (May 2001) (stating that "[c]orporate compliance is one of the key roles" that inhouse counsel perfonns). This trend follows the recognition that board-of-director duties
"embrace[] some responsibility to determine 'that the corporation's information and reporting
systems are in concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate information will
come to its attention in a timely manner.'" William H. Simon, Wrongs ofIgnorance and Ambiguity:
Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. REG. I, 25 (2005) (quoting In re
Caremark In1'l, Inc., Delivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
291. This monitoring is increased when certified public accountants approve the accounting
result sought by the company as complying with GAAP. Cf supra note 277 and accompanying text
(noting that lawyers may reasonably rely on an accountant's assertion of GAAP compliance to
avoid disciplinary sanctions).
292. See supra notes 178-94 and accompanying text.
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with an intrinsically unlawful transaction being the ultimate warning sign.293
Transactional lawfulness, however, should not be conflated with corporate
lawfulness: whether the transaction would be lawful if (or as) engaged in by
the particular client-company. A transaction can be lawful on its face-there is
nothing intrinsically unlawful, for example, about accounting transactions that
comply with GAAP-but unlawful if engaged in by that company. If the
transaction is not intrinsically unlawful, only counsel with full information of
the company-in-house counsel-are in a position to effectively judge
corporate lawfulness.
This Article has focused primarily on the duties of lawyers issuing
opinions in, as opposed to structuring, transactions. In principle, the Article's
overall framework should hold even if opining counsel also helps structure the
transaction. As structuring counsel, the lawyer is acting more like an advocate
for the client and therefore would be responsible under traditional rules of
lawyer ethics?94 As opining counsel, the lawyer additionally should be subject
to the constraints discussed in this Article. The practical consequence is that
opining counsel that also helps structure the transaction is necessarily more
exposed to the transaction's entirety and thus has more opportunity to come
across warning signs. This does not necessarily mean that such counsel will,
or should, know everything about the transaction and be able to spot all
warning signs. The client, for example, may ask counsel to help structure the
transaction subject to certain business assumptions. If these assumptions are
reasonable, there is no reason why counsel should not be able to proceed?95
The client also may not tell counsel every facet of how the transaction fits into
the company's larger financial picture. Again, so long as counsel sees a
business purpose, counsel should be able to proceed. 296 Where a warning sign
is spotted, of course, counsel should be subject to the duties discussed
elsewhere in this Article.297
This Article so far has built and tested a framework for analyzing the
duties of lawyers issuing structured-fmance opinions. I next examine the
extent to which that frarnework applies to, or informs, the duties of lawyers
issuing other types of third-party legal opinions in business and financial
transactions (hereinafter referred to as third-party business-law opinions).

293. Recall that opining counsel should assess the transaction's lawfulness by examining at
least the portion thereof relating to the opinion. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. If, in
the course of that examination, the lawyer spots warning signs, the lawyer should investigate further
before issuing the opinion. See also supra notes 98, 179-94 and accompanying text (discussing
warning signs).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32. Normative analysis of traditional rules for
lawyers acting as advocates is beyond this Article's scope.
295. Reasonable business assumptions themselves should not constitute warning signs. See
supra text accompanying note 186.
296. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 95-98, 179-94 and accompanying text.
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B. What Constraints Should Bind Other Types of Third-Party Business-Law
Opinions and the Lawyers Issuing Them?
The framework turns out to have significant applicability to the duties of
lawyers issuing any type of third-party business-law opinion. This can be seen
by reexamining the assumptions and logic of the analysis underlying the
framework.
Those assumptions began with the following: structured-finance opinions
are technically correct as to the matters they cover, address only bankruptcylaw matters (and make no accounting analysis), and are not intended by
opining counsel to achieve misleading accounting results or otherwise mislead
the pUblic. 298 Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that third-party business-law
opinions generally are technically correct as to the matters they cover,299
address only legal matters (and make no accounting analysis), and are not
intended by opining counsel to achieve misleading accounting results or
otherwise mislead the public.
The reasons that government might impose constraints on third-party
business-law opinions likewise appear similar to the reasons that government
might impose constraints on structured-fmance opinions. Except to the extent
already bound up with market efficiency or externalities, third-party businesslaw opinions are unlikely to impact social welfare, problems of the
"commons," allocative fairness, morals, or nonns. Paternalism should not be a
basis for imposing constraints to the extent, as is customary, the third-party
business-law opinions are issued in a sophisticated business and finance
context. 300 Market efficiency should not justify constraints because third-party
business-law opinions, by reducing infonnation asymmetry, appear to be an
efficient means of helping to facilitate business and financial transactions,
which, under the social-ordering paradigm, in turn fosters efficiency.30!
The principal basis, therefore, for government to impose constraints on
third-party business-law opinions appears to be, as with structured-finance
opinions, to protect against externalities. 302 Any time a lawyer issues a thirdparty business-law opinion, the lawyer potentially creates externalities. If,
however, lawyers were constrained from providing those opinions, they would
298. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
299. I later relax the assumption that the legal opinion is correct. See infra subpart III(B).
300. See TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50, at 595 (discussing opinion letters in "substantial
business transactions"); Easier Path, supra note 42, at 1894 ("Legal opinions are ... an integral and
appropriate part of a wide variety of corporate, commercial and financing transactions."). This
Article will assume such a sophisticated context, recognizing that there may be differences in the
rare cases where such opinions are issued outside of that context.
30 I. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
302. This Article's examination of the extent to which externalities caused by third-party
business-law opinions justify constraints is, as with structured-finance opinions, tempered by the
recognition that opinion-giving externalities are different from the externalities resulting from
traditional lawyering because the opining lawyer's goal-to accurately predict a given legal state by
applying law to fact-is closer to accounting goals than to the goals of traditional legal advocacy.
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be forced to substitute their judgment about externalities for that of their clients
even though, from an information standpoint, their clients generally have more
and better information about the consequences of transactions. As in the case
of structured-finance opinions, imposing a duty on lawyers to second-guess
their clients' business decisions would be inefficient and probably even
unworkable in practice. 303
This presumes that third-party business-law opinions are accurate and
thus do not distort transactional arrangements.
That is a reasonable
presumption because most such opinions are considerably less complex than
structured-finance opinions. 304 Moreover, the information failure sometimes
associated with structured-fmance transactions-the masking of liabilities that
only first become evident when a company goes bankrupeo5-is not usually
associated with other types of third-party business-law opinions. 306
Subject to these limitations, therefore, lawyers should have the right to
issue third-party business-law opinions that help facilitate lawful transactions.
The two ancillary issues related to issuance of structured-finance opinions still
must be resolved, however, in this broader context. The first such issue was
whether, in assessing lawfulness, attorneys should examine the entire
transaction or just the portion thereof relating to the opinion.
Although attorneys ideally should examine an entire transaction, this
appears unwarranted from a cost-benefit standpoint if only a portion of the
transaction needs to be examined to render the requested opinion. 307 As
before, there are at least two ways to curtail externalities without requiring
counsel to examine the entire transaction. A minimalist approach is to permit
counsel to assume legality if the portion of the transaction relevant to their
opinion is lawful and, in the course of preparing due diligence for their
opinion, they do not spot warning signs putting them on notice of problems.
When, however, they do spot warning signs/o8 they should investigate further
before issuing their opinion. The other approach is to supplement the
minimalist approach by requiring opining counsel to obtain, in appropriate
cases as part of their due diligence, an opinion from in-house counsel that the

303. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text (discussing why lawyers are ill-equipped
to assess and weigh the costs and benefits of business transactions being facilitated by their
opinions).
304. See supra note 28.
305. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
306. Outside of the structured-fmance context, there are generally no dual-information
problems.
307. This view is increasingly realistic as outside lawyers specialize further and companies
bring more of their day-to-day work in-house.
308. The question of what constitutes warning signs is discussed supra notes 183-94 and
accompanying text. That discussion should apply to any type of third-party business-law opinion.
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overall transaction does not violate law. As before, I am agnostic as to whether
the minimalist approach should always be supplemented in this manner. 309
The other ancillary issue concerns the meaning of lawfulness in a world
of changing laws and norms. Because this Article's analysis of that issue does
not turn on anything unique to structured-finance opinions,3lO such analysis
should be applicable to any third-party business-law opinions. Applying that
analysis, lawyers should have the right to issue third-party business-law
opinions that facilitate transactions that do not violate positive law (although, if
a transaction nonetheless violates norms, exercise of that right may be risky as
a practical matter), and retroactivity should not be used as a basis to impose
liability on opining lawyers.
Based on the foregoing, it is possible to articulate at least an initial
framework for analyzing the duties of lawyers when issuing third-party
business-law opinions. 3Il Lawyers should have the right to issue such opinions
to help facilitate lawful business and fmancial transactions. Lawful means that
neither the lawyer's opinion-giving nor, to the extent set forth below, the
transaction is illegal or unethical as a matter of positive law at the time the
opinion is issued. In assessing whether a transaction is lawful, the lawyer
should examine at least the portion thereof relating to the opinion. If, in the
course of that examination, the lawyer spots warning signs, the lawyer should
investigate further before issuing the opinion. In appropriate cases, the lawyer
may want to obtain, as part of the due-diligence investigation, an opinion from
in-house counsel stating that the overall transaction does not violate law.
Failure of in-house counsel to render such an opinion would signal a problem.
These duties parallel the duties of a lawyer issuing structured-fmance
opinions.3i2 To understand how these duties 313 would apply, consider a typical
third-party business-law opinion-a remedies opinion from a borrower's law
firm to the lender, concluding that the loan agreement is enforceable against
the borrower. 314 For illustrative purposes, assume the borrower intends to use
309. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (observing, among other things, that requiring
a no-violation-of-law opinion would be costly and inconsistent to some extent with the existing
norm that companies generally have no obligation to retain counsel when engaging in business
transactions and would not be a panacea).
310. See supra section III(A)(4).
311. I refer to this as an initial framework only because, outside of the structured-finance
context, its assumptions (that the opinions are technically correct, address only bankruptcy-law
matters, and are not intended to mislead the public) may be somewhat limiting.
312. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (articulating a framework for analyzing those
duties).
313. That is, the duties of a lawyer issuing a third-party business-law opinion.
314. See Silverado Report, supra note 50, at 181 (defming a remedies opmlOn as one
concluding that a specified transaction document is enforceable against the client, and clarifYing
that such opinion is the same as one concluding that such document is legal, valid, binding, and
enforceable); id. at 198-99 (explaining the remedies opinion); id. at 221-23 (setting forth an
illustrative opinion letter, including the remedies opinion); see generally TriBar Opinion
Committee, Special Report of the TriBar Opinion Committee: The Remedies Opinion-Deciding
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the loan proceeds to acquire another company and then increase that
company's efficiency by shutting down various of its divisions and business
lines, thereby eliminating thousands of jobs. 315
Because lawyers should have the right to issue third-party business-law
opinions that help facilitate transactions that are not unlawful at the time the
opinion is issued, this opinion should not be subject to criticism and the lawyer
issuing it should not be subject to liability. This assumes the lawyer examines
at least the portion of the loan transaction relating to the opinion. In the case of
a remedies opinion, this means that the lawyer should examine the loan
agreement and also either independently establish or rely on in-house counsel
to establish that all of the conditions necessary under contract law for the
fonnation of a contract (e.g., execution, delivery, consideration) have occurred
and that the borrower validly exists in good standing and has duly authorized
the loan agreement's execution. 316 If, in the course of doing this diligence, the
lawyer spots appropriate warning signs and does not investigate further, the
lawyer would be remiss even if the remedies opinion were technically correct.
Even if we relax the assumption that the third-party business-law opinion
is technically correct, this statement of an opining lawyer's duties should
continue to apply under existing liability standards for rendering incorrect
opinions. Assume, for example, that opining counsel intends to give a correct
opinion but is negligent. Negligence law and lawyer liability thereunder
already provide a significant incentive to motivate opining counsel to strive for
a correct opinion.
Reputatjonal cost provides an important additional
incentive. And, in cases where those incentives fail, damages assessed against
opining counsel ought to compensate the lender for losses resulting from the
incorrect opinion.
IV. Conclusions
Third-party legal opinions-which are opinions directed not to clients
but, at the request of clients, to third parties such as investors or financiers of
credit-span the entire range of business and fmandal undertakings. Indeed,
they are of far greater practical importance than opinions directed to clients

When to Include Exceptions and Assumptions, 59 Bus. LAW. 1483 (2004) (describing a remedies
opinion and the typical assumptions and inclusions, the considerations involved in determining
inclusions, and examples of what should be included when facing certain common contractual
provisions).
315. This is a variant on the hypothetical discussed supra note 152 and accompanying text.
316. See Silverado Report, supra note 50, at 198-99 (describing what a remedies opinion
covering a transaction document entails); see also TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 314, at
1486-87 (suggesting that writers of remedies opinions should review relevant law to determine if
any aspect of an agreement raises legal issues affecting enforceability and whether factual inquiry
may resolve an enforceability question).
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because they operate to reduce information asymmetry between parties to
transactions. 317
The scholarship and authorities governing an attorney's legal and ethical
duties within the adversary legal system focus mostly on advocacy, and
provide little guidance for lawyers issuing third-party legal opinions. 318 In that
capacity, lawyers do not act as advocates but must strive, in the opinion, for
accuracy and fair presentation of legal conclusions. Because lawyers
increasingly are being criticized and sued for issuing these OpInIOnS,
particularly in structured-fmance transactions, there is an urgent need for
guidance.
This Article has attempted to derive a normative framework for analyzing
the duties of lawyers issuing third-party legal opinions.3\9 Under this
framework, lawyers should have the right to issue opinions that help facilitate
transactions that are neither illegal nor unethical as a matter of positive law. In
making this assessment, the lawyer should examine at least the portion of the
transaction relating to the opinion. However, if appropriate warning signs
(such as failure to see a business purpose) are spotted in the course of that
examination,320 the lawyer should investigate further-sometimes requiring a
no-violation-of-Iaw opinion from in-house counsel-before issuing the
opinion.
This framework recognizes, among other things, the fundamental
distinction between monitoring transactional lawfulness, meaning whether the
transaction itself is intrinsically lawful, and monitoring corporate lawfulness,
meaning whether the transaction would be lawful if engaged in by the
particular client-company. A transaction can be lawful on its face but unlawful
if engaged in by that company. Because in-house counsel have, or at least
have access to, full information of the company, they can more effectively
monitor corporate lawfulness. 321
317. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (citing examples of when legal opinions
would be provided to third parties and examples of their increasing use).
318. Even lawyers' duties arising out of negligence law provide minimal guidance because,
remarkably, lawyers issuing third-party legal opinions in structured-finance transactions are
criticized and sued even when their opinions are technically correct. Critics argue, for example, that
technically correct legal opinions may be misleading if they do not fairly present the situation. See
Koppel, supra note 1, at 165-66; supra note 99 and accompanying text; see also supra text
accompanying note 100.
319. Although this Article focuses primarily on the duties of lawyers issuing opinions in, as
opposed to structuring, transactions, in principle the Article's overall framework should hold even if
opining counsel also helps to structure the transaction. See supra text accompanying notes 294-97.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 183-94 (discussing what should constitute warning
signs).
321. Earlier in this Article, I asked whether the duty to the public of lawyers issuing third-party
legal opinions is the same as the duty of an internal government lawyer to the public when writing a
legal opinion that advises on the legality of interrogation policies for enemy detainees. See supra
text accompanying note 36. Although not identical, that duty is remarkably similar. In neither case
should the lawyer act as an advocate. Lawyers issuing third-party legal opinions should strive to
accurately predict a given legal state by applying law to fact, thereby reducing information
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Apart from this normative framework, any opmmg lawyer must be
cognizant of hindsight bias-the reality that actions, including the issuance of
legal opinions, are often judged ex post with a critical eye.322 Thus, "[t]he
'nightmare' transaction for any lawyer is representing a client in a transaction
that is subsequently held to be fraudulent. . .. Opinion givers properly worry
that what they knew when they delivered an opinion letter will be judged with
the benefit ofhindsight.,,323
Because hindsight bias is exacerbated when emotions are high,324 the fact
that legal opinions are not intended to be guarantees of particular outcomes325
often can be lost. Indeed, at least some of the criticism of lawyers providing
structured-finance opinions may well boil down to the flawed syllogism
previously mentioned-the public is harmed; lawyer opinions are a sine qua
non of the harm, and lawyers are the only deep pockets; so lawyers should be
liable for the harm. 326 Lawyers therefore must always be cautious when giving
legal opinions to try to anticipate changing norms and to conform their conduct
(and due diligence) accordingly, always balancing the benefits of these
cautions against their costs.

asymmetry between the parties. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. A government
lawyer advising on the legality of interrogation policies similarly should strive to render
"independent and candid advice." See David Luban, Selling Indulgences: The Unmistakable
Parallel Between Lynn Stewart and the President's Torture Lawyers, SLATE, Feb. 14,2005, http://
slate.msn.comlidl2113447/ (arguing that Y00 and his colleagues ''were not acting as courtroom
advocates but as legal advisers, with a different professional standard" under Model Ethics Rule
2.1).
322. Actions judged with the benefit of hindsight often suffer a psychological bias: the human
tendency to exaggerate the extent to which an event that has happened could have been anticipated
in advance. Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned To Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in
Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel
Kahneman et ai. eds., 1982) ("In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been
anticipated in foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable
but also to view it as having appeared 'relatively inevitable' before it happened. People believe that
others should have been able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case."). See also
Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule:
Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REv. 587, 587 (1994) ("Hindsight bias is the tendency for
people with knowledge of an outcome to exaggerate the extent to which they believe that outcome
could have been predicted. ").
323. FIELD, supra note 51, § 3:9, at 3-14.
324. See Mitu Gulati et ai., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U.L. REv. 773, 774 (2004) ("In the
context of securities regulation, hindsight can mistakenly lead people to conclude that a bad
outcome was not only predictable, but was actually predicted by managers.").
325. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.

